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Institutional Signals and Implicit Bargains
in the ULP Strike Doctrine: Empirical




Law is not simply a prediction that preexists the sequential,
hierarchical, and purposive interaction of institutions. It is, instead,
a product of that interaction-an equilibrium, that is, a balance of
competing institutional pressures. It is a stable equilibrium when
no implementing institution is able to interpose a new view without
being overridden by another institution.1
In a recent Harvard Law Review article, Professors William
Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey offered a bold extension of legal
process jurisprudence. Stripping away the pretense that "law is a
closed system of objectively discoverable rules,"2 they focused on the
judiciary's purposive political role as a coordinate branch of
government:
[L]aw is an equilibrium, a state of balance among competing forces
or institutions. Congress, the executive, and the courts engage in
purposive behavior. Each branch seeks to promote its vision of the
* Associate Professor, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations and College of
Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A.B., 1978, University of Illinois; A.M.,
1981, Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois; M.A., 1983, Political Science,
University of Illinois; J.D., 1986, University of North Carolina. Bill Murphy, Gene
Gressman, Daniel Pollitt, John Orth, Jim Pfander, and Peter Feuille laid an important
foundation for this research. I especially appreciate Martin Wagner's contribution of
valuable historical materials, and Bill Eskridge's comments to an earlier draft. To Janet
LeRoy, Sarah LeRoy, Samuel LeRoy and Benjamin LeRoy, I owe a debt of gratitude for
their love, support and patience. Errors of commission or omission are mine alone.
1. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword- Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REv. 26,32 (1994).
2. Id at 29.
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public interest, but only as that vision can be achieved within a
complex, interactive setting in which each organ of government is
both cooperating with and competing with the other organs. To
achieve its goals, each branch also acts strategically, calibrating its
actions in anticipation of how other institutions would respond. We
doubt that many readers will question our assumptions of
institutional rationality and interdependence with respect to
Congress, the President, and administrative agencies. To some
lawyers, however, the notion that the Supreme Court engages in
strategic behavior may be shocking.3
Although an impressive vein of legal commentary cites this
seminal article as though it states a definitive truth,4 Eskridge and
Frickey were careful to characterize their work as incomplete.5 In
particular, they conceded that their Article was a "thought
experiment," a tacit acknowledgment that it lacked the rigorous
empiricism of their earlier scholarship.6
This article joins two very different but complementary lines of
scholarly inquiry. One examines the evolution of the declining right
to strike in U.S. labor law.7 This literature broods over the Supreme
3. Id at 28.
4. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Equilibrium Theory, the FICAs Model, and International
Banking Law, 38 HARV. INT'L L. 1 (1997); Michael C. Doff, Foreword.- The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal
Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 110 HARv. L.
REv. 1393 (1996).
5. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 95-96, stating: "No doubt even the reader who
finds our self-styled 'thought experiment' useful also finds it incomplete .... [I]f we have
raised more questions than we have answered, they strike us as important questions to be
raised."
6. Compare Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1 with William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE LJ. 331 (1991) (using
comprehensive empirical evidence to document congressional responses to the Supreme
Court's statutory interpretation decisions).
7. Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike": Protecting New Forms of Collective Work
Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1994);
Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Let's Call It a Draw: Striker Replacements and the
Mackay Doctrine, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1003 (1997); Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker
Replacements: A Law, Economics, and Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 363
(1995); William R. Corbett, A Proposal for Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent
Striker Replacements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 813 (1994); Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargaining or "Collective Begging"?:
Reflections on Antistrikebreaker Legislation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1994); Samuel
Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 LAB. LAW 287 (1987); Matthew W. Finkin,
Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, U. ILL. L. REV. 547 (1990); Joan
Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the "Union Sentiments" of Permanent
Replacements, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 691 (1988); Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall,
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Court's role in creating the striker replacement doctrine, a policy that
permits employers to blunt strikes by hiring permanent employees to
replace striking workers.8
This scholarly literature is limited by its tendency to reach
conclusions based on a textual reading of lead cases. Since this mode
of analysis makes no use of empirical data to test conclusions, many
of these articles offer only a plausible view that judicial and agency
construction has constrained the right to strike. More fundamental,
this method appears to miss the interactive effects of a judiciary with
a long history of legislating labor policy and the National Labor
Relations Board's ("Board" or "NLRB") tendency of limiting
appellate court precedents that the Board finds repugnant to
collective bargaining.
Eskridge and Frickey's Law as Equilibrium provides the second
line of inquiry-here, a view of dynamic lawmaking institutions, with
judges and NLRB members whose values influence their decisions.
And, at least on its face, Law as Equilibrium offers a powerful
explanatory theory because it views judges and Board members as
purposive actors whose decisions reflect precedents, but also project
new policies. This framework, though appealing to intuition, needs
Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Example, 102 YALE LJ. 1803
(1993); Hal Keith Gillespie, Comment, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business
Necessity, 50 TEX. L. REV. 782 (1972); Charles Thomas Kimmett, Note, Permanent
Replacements, Presidential Power, and Politics: Judicial Overreaching in Chamber of
Commerce v. Reich, 106 YALE L. 811 (1996); Michael H. LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in
the Public Policy of Striker Replacements: Combination, Conspiracy, Concert and
Cartelization, 34 B. C. L. REV. 257 (1993); Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Treatment of
Permanently Replaced Strikers, 1935-1991: Public Policy Implications, 13 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1 (1995); Michael H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use Of Permanent Striker
Replacements: Empirical Analysis Of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991,16 BERKELEY .
EMP. & LAB. L. 169 (1995); Michael H. LeRoy, The Mackay Radio Doctrine Of
Permanent Striker Replacements and the Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act: Questions Of
Preemption, 77 MINN. L. REV. 843 (1993); William P. McLane, Striking Down the
Workplace Fairness Act: The Death of an Employee's Right to Return to the Job, 19 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 375 (1994); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25
U.S.F. L. REV. 295 (1991); Douglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked Aspects of the Strike
Replacement Issue, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 363 (1992); William J. Ryan, Labor Law: Rights
of Striking Employees, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1098 (1989); George Schatzki, Some
Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-"Protected" Concerted Activities,
47 TEX. L. REV. 378 (1969); William D. Turner, Restoring Balance to Collective
Bargaining: Prohibiting Discrimination Against Economic Strikers, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 685
(1994); David Westfall, Striker Replacements and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7 LAB.
LAW. 137 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Pollitt, supra note 7, at 306, stating that "the Mackay Radio doctrine is an
increasingly effective tool with which employers can undermine employees' efforts to
organize themselves and to meaningfully bargain with their employer."
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empirical testing.9
My study examines one particular labor policy that is the unique
creation of appellate court and agency interaction: the unfair labor
practice (ULP) strike doctrine. This doctrine is critically important in
labor disputes because it negates an employer's right to permanently
replace strikers. Thus, when a strike is ruled to be a ULP strike, not
only do replaced strikers enjoy a right of immediate reinstatement at
the expense of their replacements, 10 they also are entitled to
backpay."1
Congress played no role in creating this doctrine. This article
provides textual evidence that federal courts and the NLRB engaged
in the kind of institutional bargaining and signaling that Eskridge and
Frickey hypothesized. But that is only part of the story related here.
My research identifies 467 NLRB rulings from 1938 to 1999 that
a work stoppage was either a ULP or economic strike. Given the
great change in ULP strike doctrine in this lengthy period, the
percentage of work stoppages ruled by the Board to be ULP strikes
should widely fluctuate. But my results show a paradox. This
percentage has been remarkably stable, varying in a 10% range since
the 1940s.12 Thus, using textual and statistical research methods, I
find persuasive evidence of the Law as Equilibrium thesis.
A. The NLRA's Economic Weapons
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is premised on the
simple idea that an employer and labor union shall negotiate "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.1 3 The law
does not require that these parties reach an agreement. 14
Nevertheless, it encourages this outcome. 5 The NLRA is also based
9. At least two studies have provided such testing by using the NLRB and federal
courts as the basis for natural experimentation. See James J. Brudney, Reflections on
Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996); James J.
Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging
Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 939 (1996).
10. E.g., Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,508 (1983).
11. E.g., TWA v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 643 F. Supp. 470, 480 (W.D.
Mo. 1986).
12. See Table 2, infra, at p. 71.
13. 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1998).
14. Iti (providing that the obligation to bargain "does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession").
15. See 29 U.S.C. §151 (1998) (providing that "[i]t is hereby declared to be the policy
of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce... by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
... for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of... employment").
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on a realistic premise about what motivates recalcitrant parties to find
common ground: avoidance of the other side's use of lawful, and
sometimes devastating, economic weapons.'
6
The strike is a union's main economic weapon.17 The mere
threat of a walkout hurts an employer's business.18 Once a strike
occurs, an employer often shuts down or curtails business
operations.' 9 Strikes also have a lingering effect by causing once loyal
customers to take their business to competitors.
2 °
16. Justice Brennan offered this insightful explanation in NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,489 (1960):
The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on
occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. Abstract logical analysis might find
inconsistency between the command of the statute to negotiate toward an
agreement in good faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic weapons,
frequently having the most serious effect upon individual workers and productive
enterprises, to induce one party to come to the terms desired by the other. But
the truth of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of our national labor
relations policy, the two factors-necessity for good-faith bargaining between
parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices to each to make the
other party incline to agree on one's terms--exist side by side.
17. The strike is protected by 29 U.S.C. §163 (1998), which provides that "[n]othing in
this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right."
18. See AMR Earnings Drop Slightly, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 21, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 8280630 (threatened strike by pilots caused many customers to re-
book with competing carriers, thereby contributing to company's $70 million strike costs);
Peter Corbett, Amwest Earnings to Exceed Forecasts Sickout by Rival's Pilots Overcame
Threat of Strike, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1999, at Dl, available in 1999 WL 4162477
(America Air West Airlines lost ticket sales because its flight attendants threatened to
walk out in a contract dispute); Fedex Strike Would Have Major Impact on Mid-South,
THE COMM. APP., Nov. 21, 1998, at All, available in 1998 Wil 21180642 (mere threat of
pilots strike perceived as a serious issue for competitors and for the entire Memphis
economy because of the need for reliable service in the package delivery business);
Teamsters, Car Haulers Extend Talks Past Deadline; Threatened Strike Could Cut Into
Sales, CHI. TRIB., June 1,1999, at 4, available in 1999 WL 2878952 (threat of car-transport
strike has automakers worried about lost sales and lack of space to store newly made cars).
19. See, e.g., Gregory S. Johnson, Regional Trucker Folds After Walkout by Teamsters,
J. COM., Dec. 23, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 20948050. Following a three-week
strike during which ANR Advance Co. lost many of its customers, this shipping company
closed its business. As a result, 1,400 drivers in 46 terminals in 14 states lost their jobs.
20. See, e.g., A Year After UPS Strike, Its Rivals Are Real Victors, CHIC. TRIB., Aug. 2,
1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 2881780. Reporting that one year after the Teamsters'
national strike against United Parcel Service, UPS business remained depressed. The
strike resulted in a net reduction of 6 percent of UPS jobs. The article concluded that "the
only people who've come out ahead seem to be UPS' rivals, which seized on the shutdown
of the dominant delivery company to snap up business and have managed to hold on to
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Employers are not helpless, however, against this powerful
weapon.21 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., a 1938 Supreme
Court decision, permits employers to hire permanent striker
replacements.22 Just as the strike causes prospective, present, and
lingering injury, the striker replacement doctrine impairs the right to
strike. An employer's threat to hire replacements is often enough to
deter workers from striking.23 Once an employer hires permanent
replacements, it is under no duty to reinstate strikers until they have
offered to end their walkout unconditionally. Even then, the
employer has no duty to reinstate a striker until a vacancy opens in
her position.24 This employer response to strikes can be so effective
that it harms a union for many years.23
many of their new clients."
21. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970), stating that the NLRA
"does not contemplate that unions will always be secure and able to achieve agreement
even when their economic position is weak, or that strikes and lockouts will never result
from a bargaining impasse. It cannot be said that the Act forbids an employer... to rely
ultimately on its economic strength to try to secure what it cannot obtain through
bargaining."
22. 304 U.S. 333 (1938). In dictum, the Court stated the permanent striker
replacement doctrine:
Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees with others
in an effort to carry on the business. Although § 13 of the act provides, "Nothing
in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike," it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act
denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business
by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge
those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume
their employment, in order to create places for them.
Id. at 345-46.
23. See Key Management Weapon: Threat to Replace Workers, CHIC. TRIB., Aug. 11,
1997, at 13, available in 1997 WL 3577138 (reporting a common view among industrial
relations experts that employer threats to hire permanent replacements have made union
workers fearful of striking). See also Prohibiting Permanent Replacement of Striking
Workers, 1991: Hearing on H.R. 5 before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm.
on Public Works and Transportation, 102d Cong., 39 (1991) (statement of Juliette Lenoir,
Vice President of Association of Flight Attendants):
In 1976, our members at Alaska Airlines were forced to go on strike, then 23
days into the strike, flight attendants received their first letter from management
threatening that striking flight attendants would be permanently replaced....
When we learned it was legal to replace people permanently, we quickly signed a
back-to-work agreement. ... [Clearly we had been punished for striking and had
to accept some less-than-desirable provisions.
24. This duty was set forth in Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, enforced, 414 F.2d 99
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
25. See TWA v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), criticizing the majority's decision to permit TWA to induce
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In theory, government is not permitted to alter the balance of
economic weapons.26 Instead, the free play of market forces is to
determine strike (and by extension, bargaining) outcomes.27
However, as the ULP strike doctrine shows, this theory is a fiction.
When a union engages in a ULP strike,28 its members cannot be
permanently replaced. 29 Thus, strike costs to ULP strikers are much
less than for permanently replaced strikers.
30
strikers back to work by offering them domiciles and bidding rights held by continuing
strikers:
By interpreting the RLA as affording protection to striking employees only in
the most unusual circumstances, the Court encourages employers to test the
limits, knowing that the burden will fall on the employees to demonstrate that
the employer's conduct has crossed an artificially high barrier of 'implied'
tolerance for employer coercion. The Court thus needlessly creates incentives to
undermine long-term labor stability and to expand labor conflicts beyond their
natural bounds.
Id at 456-57.
26. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1996),
invalidating President Clinton's Executive Order that provided for debarment of federal
contractors who hire permanent striker replacements: "[L]abor relations policy is different
because of the NLRA and its broad field of pre-emption. No state or federal official or
government entity can alter the delicate balance of bargaining and economic power that
the NLRA establishes, whatever his or its purpose may be."
27. See also International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132,146 (1976):
"This weapon of self-help, permitted by federal law, formed an integral part of
the [union's] effort to achieve its bargaining goals during negotiations with the
[employer]. Allowing its use is a part of the balance struck by Congress between
the conflicting interests of the union, the employees, the employer and the
community .... If the Ohio law of secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe
the same type of conduct which Congress focused upon but did not proscribe
when it enacted § 303, the inevitable result would be to frustrate the
congressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help available, and to
upset the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our
national labor policy."
28. An unfair labor practice striker is someone who withholds her labor partly or
wholly because of an employer's unfair labor practice. See 2 ABA SECTION OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1100-1104 (Patrick Hardin
ed., 3d ed. 1992).
29. In 1989, the United Mine Workers engaged in a bitter strike against Pittston Coal
Corp. See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Bitter Strike May Be at End, But Ripples are Widely
Felt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1989, at A27. Pittston hired replacements for approximately
1,700 striking members of the United Mine Workers, but due to an NLRB ruling that the
strike was precipitated by the employer's unfair labor practices, the company eventually
reinstated all but 13 strikers. Ratification of Pittston Contract Hailed by Union Leaders,
Secretary Dole, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 35, at A-7, A-10 (Feb. 21, 1990).
30. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
summarizing this doctrinal difference: "Unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to
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This Article provides the first empirical investigation of ULP
strike trends from 1938 (when Mackay Radio was decided) to 1999.
Thus, it adds to the recent research literature that critically assesses
the striker replacement doctrine.31 More specifically, it provides an
empirical assessment of a key aspect of the nation's labor policies;
that is, the relative degree to which strikers are either protected or
unprotected by the ULP strike doctrine. This is important because
unions32 and employers33 strenuously argued over this matter as
immediate reinstatement to their former jobs upon their unconditional offer to return.
Economic strikers have more limited rights; they are entitled to reinstatement upon their
unconditional offer to return to their positions only when their former positions or
comparable positions become available."
31. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to
Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 397, 421 (1992) ("it is clear that the
Mackay Radio decision severely undermined the statutorily protected right of employees
to strike."); Estreicher, supra note 7, at 599 (1994) ("Whatever the causes of the decline in
union density, under present conditions Mackay Radio threatens to unravel the statutory
scheme."); Getman & Marshall, supra note 7, at 1877 ("The strike at Jay demonstrates
that Mackay has helped to create a labor law system that permits the economicdevastation of our best people."); Kimmett, supra note 7, at 814 ("The Reich court treated
Mackay as if it were explicit statutory text and failed to acknowledge the limitations
placed on it by Congress and the Supreme Court."); Pollitt, supra note 7, at 306 ("the
Mackay Radio doctrine is an increasingly effective tool with which employers can
undermine employees' efforts to organize themselves and to meaningfully bargain with
their employer."); Note, One Strike and You're Out? Creating An Efficient Permanent
Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARv. L. REv. 669, 674 (1993) ("Employers currently abuse
the right of hiring permanent replacements in order to rid themselves of unions, thus
destroying the benefits that unions provide.").
32. See Preventing Replacement of Economic Strikers: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, 101st Cong.
39 (1990). Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D. Ohio) and Thomas Donahue, Secretary-
Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, had this exchange:
Senator Metzenbaum: How do you account for the fact that the Mackay decision,
made about 50 years ago, that for about 40 years there were no problems, and
employers went along and did not bring in permanent replacements? Then,
starting about 10 years ago, we found this new movement to bring in permanent
replacements ....
Mr. Donahue: I think there has been a sea change, Senator, in the whole climate
of industrial relations in this country. I think the employers have been
emboldened by President Reagan's action in the PATCO strike-there simply is
no question in my mind about that.
Id
33. See Prohibiting Permanent Replacement of Striking Workers: Hearing on H.R. 5
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works and
Transportation, 102d Cong. 209 (1991), testimony of Alliance to Keep America Working,
explaining that "by forcing an employer to accept demands for higher wages... the bill
would logically result in making American products too expensive to compete in Europe
and Japan... or anywhere else in the world."
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Congress recently voted on legislation to alter the striker replacement
doctrine. 34
B. Article Overview
Section II analyzes the origin of the ULP strike doctrine. In
Section H(A), I show that the emerging striker replacement doctrine
concerned leading appellate judges such as Learned Hand.35
As the doctrine was informally developed by other circuit courts,
these judges created a significant counter-balance when they stated
the ULP striker doctrine in Remington Rand. I discuss this
development in Section II(B) 36
Section 1(C) shows that by the time the Supreme Court decided
Mackay Radio in 1938,37 appeals courts were already conflicted over
the rights of strikers and striker replacements.38 By ruling for the
union on the merits of this case, but providing the striker replacement
doctrine in important dictum, the Court attempted to accommodate
conflicting views among lower courts.39
By the 1950s, Mackay Radio's equilibrium in balancing the rights
of strikers and striker replacements destabilized. By adopting the
ULP doctrine in Mastro Plastics v. NLRB,40 the Court stated a clear
and detailed rationale for protecting ULP strikers.41 Section II(D)
also shows this decision corrected a growing imbalance of rights in
favor of replacement workers resulting from pro-employer
amendments to the NLRA in 1947.42
In Section II(E), I apply Eskridge and Frickey's principles
relating to institutional signals and bargains.43 In offering the striker
replacement doctrine, the Court acted out a broader ideological
strategy to lessen its isolation from the Congress and presidency
concerning New Deal legislation.44 Thus, I conclude that the Mackay
Radio Court adroitly positioned itself to avert open conflict in the
appellate courts on the treatment of strikers and replacements, while
at the same time, advantageously ceding ground to a more potent
34. Infra notes 321-325.
35. Infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
36. Infra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
37. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938).
38. Infra note 107.
39. Infra notes 108-115 and accompanying text.
40. 350 U.S. 270, 284 (1956).
41. Infra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
42. Infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
43. Infra notes 134-144 and accompanying text.
44. Infra notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
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Congress and President.
Section II(E) also explains how the Mastro Plastics Court
counter-balanced Republican amendments to the NLRA that were
immoderate even for a conservative president, 45 Dwight Eisenhower.
His surprise attempt to reach a middle-ground labor policy failed,46
but several years later, the Mastro Plastics Court provided the
judiciary a doctrinal tool to fulfill Eisenhower's policy goal.
Section III(A) presents evidence of another emerging conflict
among the appellate courts concerning the extension of the ULP
strike doctrine. Mastro Plastics dealt with an infrequent situation, a
strike in protest of an employer's unlawful treatment of a union
member. Appellate courts were divided about a more common
situation, unlawful employer behavior during an economic strike.47
By extending the ULP strike doctrine to these situations, this policy
reached its apogee in NLRB v. Erie Resistor.48
By the 1970s and 1980s, the American labor movement was in
decline. Section IIM(B) analyzes how the Court began to reflect this
change. Section III(B)(1) examines the most important decision to
curb the ULP strike doctrine, TWA v. Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants.49 In Section III(B)(2), I explore a concurrent
development in several appellate decisions that further narrowed the
ULP strike doctrine. By minimizing an employer's duty to provide
financial information during contract negotiations, these precedents
diminished grounds for a ULP strike ruling.50
Section III(C) applies Eskridge and Frickey's concept of
institutional signals and implicit bargains to the now-contracting ULP
strike doctrine. This policy shift was part of the Court's broader
retreat in the 1980s from securing collective bargaining rights.
Belknap v. Hale5' and Pattern Makers League v. NLRB,52 discussed in
Section III(C)(1) 53 and Section III(C)(2) 5 4 signaled this retraction. I
then discuss how a bloc of justices strategically moved the Court to
reflect anti-union values emerging in the executive branch 55
45. Infra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
46. Infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
47. Infra note 160.
48. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
49. 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
50. Infra notes 206-225.
51. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
52. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
53. Infra notes 229-241 and accompanying text.
54. Infra notes 242-261 and accompanying text.
55. Infra notes 262-266.
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Although this shift harmonized the Court with two Republican
administrations, it opened a bitter dispute within the Court's ranks.
56
My empirical research is presented in Section IV. In Section
IV(A),57 I explain why ULP strikes are an appropriate unit of analysis
to test the Law as Equilibrium thesis, and in Section IV(B) I discuss
my research methods.58 Section IV(C), which is highlighted by Table
2, sets forth my research results and conclusions.5 9 My results show
that NLRB rulings for ULP strikes varied within a narrow 10% range
for the 1940s through 1990s.
In Section V, I conclude that these results are remarkable
evidence of decisional consistency. This is astonishing given the sea-
change in strike activity over the past sixty years,6° and more central
to Law as Equilibrium, is an enduring example of the continuing
policy balance that the Supreme Court and NLRB have struck
through signals and implicit bargains since 1938.
II. Judicial Origins of the Unfair Labor Practice Doctrine
A. Federal Judges Developed Striker Replacement Doctrines
Federal courts play a key role in determining American labor
law. Congress never legislated the ULP strike doctrine. It considered
the doctrine only sporadically.61 This policy was stated in a 1938
Second Circuit decision, NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc.62
The timing of this decision was uncanny. This was the same year
that federal courts produced the seminal striker-replacement case,
Mackay Radio.63 Thus, with these two decisions, the judiciary
regulated striker replacement issues more than Congress.64
This development was not novel. American courts had been
refereeing replacement-worker strikes for nearly fifty years.65 The
56. Infra notes 267-279 and accompanying text. Also see Table 1 at p. 61.
57. Infra notes 284-299 and accompanying text.
58. Infra notes 300-303 and accompanying text.
59. Infra notes 304-305 and Table 2 at p. 52.
60. Infra notes 312-320 and accompanying text.
61. See infra indented text and bottom paragraph of supra note 321-323
62. 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
63. Remington Rand was decided February 14, 1938 and Mackay Radio was decided
May 16, 1938.
64. See supra note 17. This void was created by an incredibly cryptic treatment of the
right to strike.
65. In fact, there is good evidence that the American judiciary was steadily influenced
by legal developments in England. By an accretion of common law decisions, state and
federal courts in the U.S. transplanted the English prohibition against striker molestation
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dominant tendency in these decisions, reflected in Mackay Radio, was
conservative and aimed at criminalizing the means and ends of
strikes.66
The timing of Remington Rand signified, therefore, the return of
federal courts as labor policy makers. When earlier courts dominated
this substantive law, they usually wielded injunctive power to end
strikes and punish strikers.67 These courts were so one-sided that
or obstruction of replacement workers. Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, Law Reports, 6
Eq. 551 (1868) was especially influential. Two officers of the Cotton Spinners Union were
charged with damaging their employer's property simply by publishing this appeal to
potential striker replacements in the Manchester Guardian: "Wanted, all well-wishers to
the Operative Cotton Spinners' Association not to trouble or cause any annoyance at the
Springhead Spinning Company, Lees, by knocking at the door of their office, until the
dispute between them and the self-acting minders is finally terminated." The court viewed
this as a polite form of intimidation resulting in economic injury when it concluded: "This
Court will interfere to prevent any acts amounting to crime, if they do not stop at crime,
but also go to the destruction or deterioration of the value of property."
As the sheer number of cases suggest, American courts played a prominent role in
regulating labor disputes, reflecting the absence of any legislative scheme. State decisions
include State v. Stockford, 58 A. 769 (Conn. 1904); Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Mach.
Works, 62 S.E. 236 (Ga. 1908); A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union, 83
N.E. 940 (Ill. 1908); O'Brien v. People of Illinois, 75 N.E. 108 (Ill. 1905); Franklin Union v.
People, 77 N.E. 176 (Ill. 1906); Underhill v. Murphy, 78 S.W. 482 (Ky. 1904); Plant v.
Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900); Vegelahn v. Gunther, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896);
Enterprise Foundry Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 112 N.W. 685 (Mich. 1907); Hamilton-
Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 32 S.W. 1106 (Mo. 1895); Branson v. Industrial Workers of the
World, 95 P. 354 (Nev. 1908); Connett v. United Hatters of N. Am., 74 A. 188 (N.J. Ch.
1909); Typothetae of City of New York v. Typographical Union No. 6,122 N.Y.S. 975 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1910); Jones v. Maher, 116 N.Y.S. 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909); O'Neil v. Behanna,
37 A. 843 (Pa. 1897); Wick China Co. v. Brown, 30 A. 261 (Pa. 1894); Cote v. Murphy, 28
A. 190 (Pa. 1894); Murdock v. Walker, 25 A. 492 (Pa. 1893); Crump v. Commonwealth, 6
S.E. 620 (Va. 1888). Federal courts, although somewhat less active, still played a key role.
See C'oeur D'Alene Consol. & Mining Co. v. Miners Union of Wardner, 51 F. 260 (C.C.D.
Idaho 1892); Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 80 F. 811 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1897);
American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers Union, 90 F. 608 (C.C.N.D.
Ohio 1898).
66. An 1887 American treatise on criminal law showed the extent to which courts were
regulating labor disputes:
Workmen may combine lawfully for their own protection and common benefit;
for the advancement of their own interests; for the development of skill in their
trade or to prevent overcrowding therein, or to encourage those belonging to
their trade to enter their guild; for the purpose of raising their wages .... The
moment, however, that they proceed by threats, intimidation, violence,
obstruction, or molestation, in order to secure their ends ... to encourage strikes
or breaches of contract among others ... they render themselves liable to
indictment.
WRIGHT, CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES at 187, (Carson's Appendix to American Ed. 1887).
67. See Charles Noble Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARv. L. REv. 487, 492
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scholars 68 and Congress69 sharply rebuked them.
Remington Rand and Mackay Radio set forth the yin and yang of
striker replacement policy. Remington Rand protected strikers, and
by extension, their unions. Mackay Radio protected employers.
Thus, in one sense, these courts served as Democratic and Republican
proxies on a critical labor issue that Congress avoided when enacting
the NLRA.
These decisions also presaged ideological cleavage that would
occasionally divide federal judges for decades. Even today, the
Remington Rand and Mackay Radio fault-line produces tremors.70
In addition, Remington Rand highlights the role that influential
federal judges have played in striker replacement cases. Certainly,
this law reflects a vacuum left by Congress; however, it also reveals
(1898), regarding the role that courts played in late nineteenth century labor disputes:
The injunctions issued by the federal courts ... have been of especial importance
in the controversies arising out of strikes and labor difficulties. The courts rest
jurisdiction on various grounds, but mainly under three heads: First, on their
right to protect receivers appointed by them in the possession and management
of the property entrusted to them. Secondly, on their general right to protect
suitors, entitled to come into their forum, from irreparable injury to property and
multiplicity of suits. Thirdly, under federal statutes protecting some function
confided to national control, as the United States mail or interstate commerce,
and often providing especially for injunction as a means of enforcing the law.
68. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 13-24
(1930). For example, Frankfurter and Greene claimed: "The eagerness of employers to be
heard by a federal court is clearly revealed by the devices to which they resort in order to
present an alignment of parties that meets the requisite diversity of citizenship .... The
courts are indifferent to this collusion for obtaining the benefit of the law as applied by the
federal courts." Id at 13-15.
69. In 1932, three years before providing workers the right to strike in the NLRA,
Congress took a different tack in protecting strikes from employer-friendly courts. By
enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress exercised its constitutional authority to
divest federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in most labor disputes. Norris
LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1994)). Rep. Fiorello LaGuardia, the bill's author, put forth this justification:
Gentlemen, there is one reason why this legislation is before Congress, and that
one reason is disobedience of the law on the part of whom? On the part of
organized labor? No. Disobedience of the law on the part of a few Federal
judges. If the courts had been satisfied to construe the law as enacted by
Congress, there would not be any need of legislation of this kind. If the courts
had administered even justice to both employers and employees, there would be
no need of considering a bill of this kind now. If the courts had not emasculated
and purposely misconstrued the Clayton Act, we would not today be discussing
an anti-injunction bill.
75 Cong. Rec. 5478 (1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).
70. See infra notes 267-279 and accompanying text.
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judicial ego and ambition.71
Remington Rand was decided by an all-star line-up of judges.
Due partly to its repeated litigation,72 this case was decided by two
Judge Hands-Learned, and his cousin, Augustus.73
While Augustus was notable in his own right,74 his reputation was
eclipsed by Learned, who is still regarded as the most influential jurist
never to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court.75 Having recently authored
other seminal labor law decisions,76 Learned was the first judge to
apply principles of tort causation to an employer's role in provoking a
strike.77 Judge Jerome Frank, who advanced the ULP strike doctrine
in Remington Rand's second round before the Second Circuit,78 was a
71. See David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment
Tradition, 95 YALE LJ. 857 (1986).
72. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 871 (2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J.),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938). Later, as a result of the NLRB's petition to the Second
Circuit to modify a Special Master's interim report concerning implementation of the
court's 1938 enforcement order, the Second Circuit revisited the case in NLRB v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1942) (authored by Judge Jerome Frank and
joined by Judge Augustus Hand).
73. Both judges sat simultaneously on the Second Circuit's U.S. Court of Appeals.
74. See, e.g., Charles Wyzanski, On Augustus Hand, 61 HARV. L. REV. 573 (1948).
75. This view is so widely held that it scarcely needs substantiation. See generally
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994). Harvard Law
School recognized Learned Hand's status as the premier legal authority of his time when
he was asked to deliver the Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lectures in 1958 (published in
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGirS 653 (1958)).
76. See NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d
Cir. 1942), providing that "[w]hen all the other workmen in a shop make common cause
with a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support,
they engage in a 'concerted activity' for 'mutual aid or protection,' although the aggrieved
workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome." This
labor law theory continues to prompt important commentary. See, e.g., Marion Crain,
Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality, and Labor
Speech, 82 GEO. L. J. 1903,2001 n.223 (1994). See also NLRB v. Federbush Co. Inc., 121
F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941), where Judge Hand poignantly wrote: "Words are not pebbles
in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence... [and] the relation between
the speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most important [factor in determining
meaning]."
77. He concluded that the employer's "refusal [to bargain] was at least one cause of
the strike, and was a tort.., it rested upon the tortfeasor to disentangle the consequences
for which it was chargeable from those from which it was immune." NLRB v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872 (2d. Cir. 1938). A decade later, Judge Learned Hand, in an
opinion joined by Judge Jerome Frank, set forth the influential legal formula for
negligence in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(defining negligence as a failure to take precautions that are less expensive than the cost of
an accident multiplied by its probability).
78. In fact, Judge Frank was the first judge to use the term "unfair labor practice
strike," in NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919, 928 n.8 (2d Cir. 1942).
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widely influential scholar 79 and judge.8° Judge Charles Clark, also an
influential judge,81 joined in Frank's decision.
Identifying these judges is important because the Court and
commentators have focused exclusively on Learned Hand, thereby
obscuring the judiciary's more systematic role in forming the ULP
doctrine.82
B. The ULP Striker Replacement Doctrine Originated in Remington
Rand
The Remington Rand Corp. was a high-tech firm with worldwide
operations.83 By 1934, its employees at six manufacturing plants in
New York, Connecticut, and Ohio were organized into various labor
79. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (contending that a
judge's social and psychological biases lay behind decisions); JEROME FRANK, COURTS
ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949).
80. For example, he played a great role in helping to refine federal rules for summary
judgment. See Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1897
(1998).
81. See Kenneth L. Port, Learned Hand's Trademark Jurisprudence: Legal Positivism
and the Myth of the Prophet, 27 PAC. LJ. 221, 257-58 (1996)(assessing Judge Clark's
impact on trademark law); Wald, supra, note 48 at 1898 (discussing the intellectual battle
between Judge Clark and Judge Frank).
82. Justice William Brennan inadvertently contributed to this by appearing to single
out Learned Hand's role in leading the charge against the Mackay Radio doctrine. See
Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983):
I share the Court's concern over the plight of workers hired to replace striking
employees. Contrary to the Court's suggestion, however, strikes are, to some
extent, 'war' .... As Judge Learned Hand stated more than forty years ago in a
case involving the reinstatement of strikers:
It is of course true that the consequences are harsh to those who have taken
the strikers' places; strikes are always harsh; it might have been better to
forbid them in quarrels over union recognition. But with that we have
nothing to do; as between those who have used a lawful weapon and those
whose protection will limit its use, the second must yield; and indeed, it is
probably true today that most men taking jobs so made vacant, realize from
the outset how tenuous is their hold (citation omitted).
Scholars have picked up on and perpetuated this attribution. See Estreicher, supra note 7,
at 906; Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1379, 1384 (1988); Michael H. LeRoy, Severance of Bargaining Relationships During
Permanent Replacement Strikes and Union Decertifications: An Empirical Analysis and
Proposal to Amend Section 9(c)(3) of the NLRA, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1019, 1086 n.103
(1996); and Note, One Strike and You're Out? Creating an Efficient Permanent
Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARV. L. REV. 669, 686 n.35 (1993).
83. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1938) (explaining
that the company manufactured typewriters and general office equipment at "plants
scattered all over the world").
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unions that combined into a district council.84 Late in 1935, news
articles reported that the company was secretly building a plant in
Elmira, New York to produce a new machine, dubbed the "MadameX.,,8
Concerned that these rumors were true and meant that the
company planned to take work from existing plants, union officers
requested meetings with the company president but were rebuffed. 86
This led to a strike vote on May 10 at all plants.87 When the company
conducted its own poll of workers on May 21, union officials
interfered by dissuading co-workers from voting or by leading a work
stoppage. 88 The Company discharged these officers without reason.89
Within a week the union went on strike.90
According to the Second Circuit, "[t]he strike was vigorously
contested on both sides, the respondent engaged the services of well-
known strike-breaking agencies, between whom and the strikers the
usual collisions took place with mutual recrimination. "91 By late
1935, the strike failed and was ended.92 The company abandoned one
plant and reduced work at two others while it opened the Elmira
plant . 3
To appreciate the controversy that surrounded the Second
Circuit's decision, it is important to note that the Board ordered the
company to reinstate all the replaced strikers.94 Since this decision
involved several thousand replaced workers, and occurred two years
after the strike failed, the court was in a position to order sweeping
personnel changes and impose a huge backpay judgment. The
company vehemently objected to these possibilities, arguing "against
the hardship imposed upon [the replacement workers] by this
provision."95 It concluded that "to turn them out and put in the old
men after the strike had been lost is actively to intervene in an
industrial dispute. "96
In rejecting the company's argument, and ordering permanently







91. Id. at 867.
92. See id. at 868.
93. See id.





replaced strikers to their jobs, the Second Circuit stated a principle
that sharply conflicted with the Court's Mackay decision, rendered a
few months later:
It is of course true that the consequences are harsh to those who
have taken the strikers' places; strikes are always harsh; it might
have been better to forbid them in quarrels over union recognition.
But with that we have nothing to do; as between those who have
used a lawful weapon and those whose protection will limit its use,
the second man must yield; and indeed, it is probably true today
that most men taking jobs so made vacant, realize from the outset
how tenuous is their hold.97
In justifying its view that these strikers could not be permanently
replaced, the court examined the cause of the strike:
We have assumed... that the strike here in question was only for
the purpose of enforcing the union's power to negotiate for all the
men. That is not true; there had been a wage dispute, and, the
men's inability to get at the truth of the Elmira business was
another cause.
Judge Learned Hand's decision continued with a
tort analysis:
It is of course possible that the parties might have split over wages,
or over the Elmira plant, even if the respondent had negotiated
with the Joint Board. But since the refusal was at least one cause of
the strike, and was a tort.., it rested upon the tortfeasor to
disentangle the consequences for which it was chargeable from
those from which it was immune.98
It is important to note that Judge Hand did not foreclose the
possibility that an employer could lawfully hire permanent striker
replacements. 99 In his view, however, the law was to provide a
presumption against permanent replacement, unless the employer
could prove business necessity.1°°
97. Id at 872.
98. I
99. See iL, stating:
Since [the company] cannot show that the negotiations, if undertaken, would
have broken down, it cannot say that the loss of the [striker's] jobs was due to a
controversy which the act does not affect to regulate. There may be cases where
an employer can show this; if he can, it would indeed load the scales in an
industrial dispute to give back their jobs to the strikers; but the respondent did
not try to show that further negotiation would have been fruitless.
100. See id, stating.
Nevertheless, it seems to us certain that some at least of the old employees would
have been taken over; seasoned men are better than green hands, and we are not
to impute to the respondent the unlawful purpose of discriminating against union
men. The respondent could indeed have shown that there were good reasons-
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C. Mackay Radio Balanced the ULP Strike Doctrine
Scholarly commentary on Mackay Radio's role in shaping striker
replacement policy errs in two respects.
First, there is a mistaken idea that Mackay Radio is the original
source of striker replacement doctrine, and that the ULP striker
replacement doctrine evolved as a response to Mackay Radio's
treatment of economic strikers. 101 Recent Supreme Court decisions
may have contributed to this mistaken impression.102 While it is true
that the Supreme Court did not approve the ULP strike doctrine until
1956, when it decided Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,10 3 the current
understanding overlooks the circuit courts' early and serious divisions
in fashioning this policy.
Second, the current view makes too much of the fact that the
Mackay Radio doctrine was given in the form of dictum.1°4
Commentators make the point that the Court was legislating in a
statutory vacuum. 05 This is true but overlooks the Court's mediating
role in harmonizing the appellate courts' sharply conflicting views
concerning striker replacements.' 06 Closer examination shows that
aside from the effort to rid itself of the union-for not taking some of its
workmen to Elmira; but those reasons lay exclusively within its own knowledge.
That being true, it is surely reasonable to raise a presumption against it, even
though the burden remained upon the Board.
101. See, e.g., Kimmett, supra note 7, at 825 ("In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, the
Court created a distinction between unfair labor practice strikes ... and economic
strikes .... "). See also Pollitt, supra note 7, at 300.
102. See NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48,51-52 (1972), stating, or at least
strongly implying, that the ULP strike doctrine originated in the Court's 1956 Mastro
Plastics decision:
The initially discharged strikers were obviously not protesting their own
discharges, which had not yet occurred. To assimilate their status to that of their
co-workers who had not yet been discharged would eliminate the distinction
between [the] economic-striker-reinstatement rule (Mackay Radio & Telegraph)
and the unfair-labor-practice-striker-reinstatement rule (Mastro Plastics) in cases
like this one (citations omitted).
103. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
104. The most thoughtful treatment of this commentary appears in Estreicher, supra
note 7, at 583-85, labeling this as the "Aberrational Dictum" Thesis. For more recent
examples of this thesis, see Kimmett, supra note 7, at 813-16, and William Feldesman,
Dictum Carried to Extremes: Mackay Radio Revisited, 12 LAB. LAW. 197,203-04 (1996).
105. See Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike,
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547,548 (1990) ("In its 1938 opinion in Mackay Radio... the United
States Supreme Court, in dictum, defined the statutory right to engage in an economic
strike as a privilege of the employee to be replaced permanently for having exercised it.
The dictum fast became a rule.").
106. This commentary focuses on the fact that Mackay Radio stated striker replacement
doctrine in dictum. The clear implication, therefore, is that the Court was reaching to
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the Mackay Radio Court steered a middle ground between the
Second Circuit's pro-union presumption, prohibiting employers from
hiring permanent striker replacements, and the Ninth Circuit's
opposing view.107
In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,'08 employees struck
to support their union's bargaining proposals. Their strike lasted only
a few days and ended when they recognized that their cause was
lost.109 The employer broke the strike by quickly hiring striker
replacements. This changed the issue in negotiations from economic
terms to reinstatement of strikers.110 The company agreed to
reinstate everyone except poorly performing employees and strike
organizers, who, notwithstanding their union activities, "were
concededly very efficient in the performance of their duties.""'
The Board, finding that the company unlawfully discriminated
against the union officers, ordered the company to reinstate them."
2
This order treated the replacements as temporary hires. In reversing
this order," 3 the Ninth Circuit expounded a theory on striker
replacements that Remington Rand implicitly rejected a year later.
The Mackay court accepted the company's assertion that it
denied reinstatement to the union officers because it "had guaranteed
to these new employees the privilege of remaining in its employ if and
when the strike was settled, provided they desired so to do."1114 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit suggested that as long as an employer decided to
hire permanent striker replacements, there could be no inference of
unlawful discrimination. Explaining this view, the court said:
Can the Board, under the act, require the respondent to breach its
contract with these employees who have assisted it in defeating the
strike and also compel it to employ individuals who have struck and
thus abandoned their work, notwithstanding the choice of the
company in preferring the former over the latter? This question, so
stated, answers itself. Such a disregard of the right of individuals to
enter into and observe contracts that they have made, protected as
it is by fundamental constitutional guarantees, cannot be thus
interfered with.115
decide an issue that had not been placed before it.
107. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 87 F.2d 611, 628 (9th Cir. 1937).




112. See L at 628.
113. Id at 631.
114. Id at 628.
115. Id.
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By May 16, 1938, when the Supreme Court decided NLRB v.
Mackay Radio,"6 the Ninth and Second Circuit courts had taken
polar positions on the matter of striker replacements. Finding a
middle ground, the Court split these differences. It reversed the
Ninth Circuit when it determined that the Board's findings of anti-
union discrimination were supported by evidence.117 This ruling
rejected the Ninth Circuit's extreme view that the NLRB had no
constitutional authority to interfere with an employer's contract of
permanent employment with striker replacements.
On the other hand, the Court implicitly distinguished this case
from Remington Rand when it noted that "the record fails to disclose
what caused these negotiations to fail or to show that the respondent
was in any wise in fault in failing to comply with the union's demands;
and, therefore, for all that appears, the strike was not called by reason
of fault of the respondent.""18 In its oft-cited passage, the Court made
the following pronouncement concerning economic strikes:
Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking
employees with others in an effort to carry on the business.
Although § 13 provides, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so
as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike," it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act
denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue
his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is
not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers,
upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, in
order to create places for them." 9
D. Mastro Plastics Advanced the ULP Strike Doctrine
In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,120 the Supreme Court
approved the ULP strike doctrine by holding that strikers who protest
their employer's unfair labor practice cannot be permanently
replaced. The employer, fearing that workers would switch their
116. 304 U. S. 333.
117. See id. at 351.
The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in
taking back six of the eleven men and excluding five who were active union men,
the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on account of their
union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the
quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination
against them.
Id. at 347.
118. Id. at 344.
119. Id. at 345-46.
120. 350 U. S. 270 (1956).
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union membership to a rival union that the company thought was
under Communist influence, tried to force its employees to join
another union.'21
When the local president, also an employee, continued to
support the objectionable union, the company fired him.12 Seventy-
six workers spontaneously walked off the job to protest this action on
November 10, 1950, and no production occurred for a month. 23 The
company began to hire permanent replacements. 124
Mastro Plastics involved an issue of statutory interpretation that
arose in 1947, well after Remington Rand was decided. Section 8(d)
of the NLRA was amended to require a sixty-day notice period
before striking. The company contended that a spontaneous strike,
without notice, was unprotected, and therefore strikers could be
fired.1l 5 By this view, section 8(d) applied "not only to strikes for
economic benefits but to any and all strikes occurring during the
waiting period, including strikes solely against unfair labor practices
of the employer."' 26
In rejecting this contention, however, the Court expressly
adopted the ULP strike doctrine. Moreover, the majority implicitly
endorsed Judge Learned Hand's tort-analysis when it held the
company responsible for causing the strike: "In the absence of some
contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, petitioners' unfair
labor practices provide adequate ground for the orderly strike that
occurred here."'127
Mastro Plastics was anything but a neutral sounding decision. In
several passages the Court based its reasoning on a sympathetic
identification with the replaced strikers.128 Moreover, the Court
121. See id at 272.
122. See id. at 273.
123. See kL at 274.
124. See id- This is evidenced by the fact that strikers offered to return to work on
March 9, 1951 but were not reinstated as of the Supreme Court's decision on June 11,
1956.
125. See id. at 277.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 278. The Court stated: "Under those circumstances, the striking employees
do not lose their status and are entitled to reinstatement with back pay, even if
replacements for them have been made." Id. The Court also noted that "[flailure of the
Board to enjoin petitioners' illegal conduct or failure of the Board to sustain the right to
strike against that conduct would seriously undermine the primary objectives of the Labor
Act." Id.
128. Consider the Court's strong and seemingly partisan assessment:
Apart from the issues raised by petitioners' affirmative defenses, the proceedings
reflect a flagrant example of interference by the employers with the expressly
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appeared to identify unions' institutional interest in conducting a
strike when it stated that the company's interpretation of section
8(d)'s notice requirement:
would deprive them of their most effective weapon at a time when
their need for it is obvious.... This would relegate the employees
to filing charges under a procedure too slow to be effective. The
result would unduly favor the employers and handicap the
employees during negotiation periods contrary to the purpose of
the Act. There also is inherent inequity in any interpretation that
penalizes one party to a contract for conduct induced solely by the
unlawful conduct of the other, thus giving advantage to the
wrongdoer.129
In an especially revealing passage, the Court also appeared to
close a key ambiguity left open by the 1947 amendments that imposed
procedural limitations on strikes. The Senate Minority Report,
reflecting union interests, worried that the sixty-day notice
requirement of section 8(d) was "silent as to the Board's authority to
accommodate conflicting issues such as provocation on the part of the
employer.' 30 Alarmed Democrats wondered whether "an employer
desirous of ridding himself either of the employees or their
representative can engage in the most provocative conduct without
fear of redress except by a lengthy hearing before the Board and a
subsequent admonition to 'cease-and-desist.""u 31 As if anticipating
the facts in Mastro Plastics, the Report continued:
[E]mployees unwilling to idly countenance abuse, who resort to
self-help under the circumstances, are removed from the protection
of the statute and lose "employee" status. An employer is at liberty
under such circumstances freely to replace any employee bold
enough to insist upon justice.132
Answering this concern, the Court appeared to bring closure to
incomplete congressional negotiations:
The record shows that the supporters of the bill were aware of the
protected right of their employees to select their own bargaining representative. The
findings disclose vigorous efforts by the employers to influence and even to coerce
their employees to abandon the Carpenters as their bargaining representatives and to
substitute Local 318.
idL
129. 1& at 286-87.
130. S. REP. No. 80-105, pt. 2, at 21 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TiE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 463,483 (1974).
131. Id. at 21-22, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACr, 1947, at 483-84 (1974).
132. Id. at 22, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 484 (1974).
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established practice which distinguished between the effect on
employees of engaging in economic strikes and that of engaging in
unfair practice strikes. If Congress had wanted to modify that
practice, it could readily have done so by specific provision.
133
E. ULP Strike Doctrine Was Formed by Institutional Signals and Implicit
Bargains
The foregoing analysis shows that the judicial development of the
ULP strike doctrine was more conflicted than the striker replacement
literature represents. This policy formed as part of a broader
evolution of American labor law that was striving toward equilibrium.
This balancing process was driven by competing views within the
judiciary, and similar ideological impulses stirring in Congress and the
executive branch.
Mackay Radio exemplifies Law as Equilibrium's theory of
institutional signaling and bargaining. The Court's pronouncement of
striker replacement doctrine in dictum is consistent with signaling
theory:
Lawmaking institutions routinely send "signals" to one another-
expressions of preference that have no traditionally understood
legal "authority." Nonetheless, a signal may have legal
consequences, and these consequences may have been precisely the
reason for the signal. For example, "dictum" in a Supreme Court
opinion is not law in a formal sense and has no binding stare decisis
value. Yet what the Court says in its opinions, whether it is
essential to the holding or not, is often treated as "law" by other
legal actors, especially lower courts.
134
Although commentators treat Mackay Radio's dictum as though
it is stray and unintentional,135 this view overlooks the Court's
constitutional crisis in 1938. Thirteen months before deciding
Mackay Radio, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NLRA in
133. Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. at 270. Adding support to this conclusion, the Court
noted:
Senator Ball proposed an amendment, to the definition of "employee" in § 2(3)
of the Act, which unintentionally might have abrogated the distinction which
favored the employees' right to engage in unfair practice strikes as against
economic strikes, but at once withdrew the amendment as going "too far," when
this possible effect of it was brought to his attention.
IL at 289 n.24 (citing 93 Cong. Rec. 1827-28).
134. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 39.
135. This passage from Kimmet, supra note 7, at 815-16, is typical: "The NLRA...
does not explicitly address an employer's use of permanent replacements; instead, the
right to replace workers permanently is derived from dicta contained in the Mackay
decision of 1938."
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NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.13 6 That decision was pivotal in
the "switch in time that saved nine"-that is, the Court's dramatic
change in course to rule New Deal legislation constitutional. 137
Exploring the Court's paradigm-shift, Prof. Michael Ariens' historical
evidence supports Eskridge and Frickey's theory of institutional
signaling.
The main pivot in this switch was Justice Owen Roberts, who,
according to Ariens' research into Justice Felix Frankfurter's personal
letters, behaved more as a politician than a justice during 1937:
And now, with the shift by Roberts, even a blind man ought to see
that the Court is in politics, and understand how the Constitution is
"judicially" construed. It is a deep object lesson-a lurid
demonstration-of the relation of men to the "meaning" of the
Constitution.138
As for the Jones & Laughlin Court itself, Frankfurter wrote the
day after its publication: "To me it is all painful beyond words, the
poignant grief of one whose life has been dedicated to faith in the
disinterestedness of a tribunal and its freedom from responsiveness to
the most obvious immediacies of politics.' 1 39
Seen in this historical light, Mackay Radio reflected the Supreme
Court's attempt to forge a compromise within its splitting ranks.140
By upholding the NLRB's theory of anti-union discrimination, the
Court resigned itself to that agency's ascendancy as the paramount
arbiter of labor disputes. Clearly, this vindicated lower courts that
held a similar view of the NLRB's powers.141
136. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
137. See Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620,
623 n.11 (1994) (detailing a variety of possible origins for this amusing epigram).
138. Id. at 629 (citing a letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 30,
1937) in FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR
CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-45, at 392) (Max Freedman, ed., 1967)).
139. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM
YEARS 272 (1982) (quoting letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Wyzanski, April 13,
1937).
140. Given the 5-4 split in Jones & Laughlin, it seems remarkable that the Mackay
Radio decision was unanimous. (Justices Cardozo and Reed did not participate in the
decision, however.)
141. See, e.g., Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1937) (cited
in Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 336 n.3). The sharp divide in the federal judiciary over
appropriate strike policies was evident in this split decision. In dissent, Judge Northcott
subjectively mixed his notions of fairness with his statement of what the law should be:
It cannot be the law that strikes will be regarded as settled only when the strikers
admit that they are settled or that no action by an employer will terminate a
strike no matter how definite or positive such action may have been. Such a
holding is unfair to the employer and cannot, in my opinion, be justified.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
At the same time, however, Mackay Radio's striker replacement
dictum must have played well to conservative justices who clearly
understood that they were on the losing side of constitutional history,
and also to judges who were philosophically opposed to the NLRB's
regulation of strikes.142
In sum, Mackay Radio's dictum served a strategic purpose,
delineated in Eskridge and Frickey's theory:
[Clonsistent with those signals can be a way that interdependent
institutions create implicit bargains. Institutions have differing
priorities as well as preferences about public law issues. Their
differing preferences create risks of conflict, but their differing
priorities offer ways to minimize or to avoid conflict. By a series of
signals and actions, the coordinate institutions can indicate their
priorities and their willingness to reach deals whereby each
institution defers to the most important preferences of the
others. 143
Thus, the striker replacement doctrine resulted in the kind of
lawmaking efficiency that Law as Equilibrium theorizes: "This kind
of signalling among lawmaking institutions has the systemic
advantage of resolving most institutional disputes without open,
mutually destructive conflict."'144
Just as Mackay Radio served to bargain and signal within the
judiciary, Mastro Plastics extended those functions to both coordinate
branches. Read in isolation,145 that decision fails to disclose the likely
Id at 140 (Northcott, J., dissenting).
142. This view emerged in the Ninth Circuit's adjudication of Mackay Radio. Judge
Wilbur did little to disguise his contempt for the NLRB's role in these disputes:
The Board has predicated its conclusion upon the inference arising from the
refusal of the respondent to re-employ these individuals solely from the fact that
they were union employees who had been engaged actively in an unsuccessful
strike and who desired and were refused re-employment. The difficulty does not
end here, because the order of the Board in effect requires the discharge of these
men with whom respondent has entered into a binding contract and to whom it
has pledged its faith that the settlement of the strike would not interfere with
their right to continue in the employment of the company at San Francisco. Can
the Board, under the act, require the respondent to breach its contract with these
employees who have assisted it in defeating the strike and also compel it to
employ individuals who have struck and thus abandoned their work,
notwithstanding the choice of the company in preferring the former over the
latter? This question, so stated, answers itself. Such a disregard of the right of
individuals to enter into and observe contracts that they have made, protected as
it is by fundamental constitutional guarantees, cannot be thus interfered with.
Mackay Radio, 87 F.2d at 628 (citations omitted).
143. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 40-41.
144. Id. at 40.
145. A typical example occurs in Rodney B. Sorensen, Crossing the Picket Line in
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stimulus for the Supreme Court's sympathetic treatment of replaced
strikers. The Court seemed alarmed by Congress' extreme labor
policy reforms in the Taft-Hartley Act.
By way of background, Mackay Radio's striker replacement
doctrine was in an unsettled state in the 1940s and 1950s, not because
some courts rejected it (none did), but because Congress reasserted
its labor policy making. The 80th Congress' enactment of far-
reaching labor law reforms in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act appeared to
stunt the labor movement,146 and yet, a decade later the law's impact
was judged by many to be more muted than expected.147
This period, bounded by 1947 and 1959, when Congress again
amended the NLRA,148 was a time of unusual flux in American labor
policy. Two developments energized the Congress and presidency in
this period. From 1951-1953, organized labor turned away from its
goal of repealing the colossal Taft-Hartley Act by focusing on
targeted reforms. 149 This produced more serious congressional effort
to temper Taft-Hartley's harshest provisions.
At the same time, President Eisenhower was uncharacteristically
sensitive to labor's concerns, to the point of appointing a unionist,
Martin Durkin, as his Secretary of Labor.50 Eisenhower's tilt forced
Republican Senator Taft to move a comprehensive package of
Support of the Union: The New Flavor of Salting, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165,167 n.19
(1997).
146. See HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO
TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS at
665 (1950) (stating that "[tihe emphasis upon protecting the interests of those who prefer
individual bargaining, as against the desires of those who see concerted activity as the
means to effective protection of the rights of individuals, threw the weight of the law at
critical points against collective bargaining").
147. See, e.g., Joseph Shister, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on Union Strength and
Collective Bargaining, 11 INDuS. & LABOR REL. REv. 339,339 (1958):
After ten years of experience with the Taft-Hartley Act, this controversial piece
of legislation can be viewed with considerably less emotion than in the summer
of 1947. Small wonder, therefore, that organized labor rarely refers to the Act as
a "Slave Labor Law," whatever labor's objections to the Act may otherwise be.
While management representatives are still favorably inclined to the general
spirit of the statute, they have nevertheless found more than one fault with it.
Even the so-called "impartial observers" have discovered quite a few instances
where the predictions about the impact of the law have proven inaccurate.
148. See infra note 157.
149. See Benjamin Aaron, Amending the Taft-Hartley: A Decade of Frustration, 11
INDUS. & LABOR REL. REv. 327, 331 (1958) (observing that by 1953, labor's "tactics
shifted from insistence upon outright repeal to emphasis upon specific, limited
amendments").
150. See id. at 334.
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reforms aimed at softening the most severe elements of his 1947
legislation.' 5'
By 1953, policy makers who represented labor and management
interests were therefore moving toward an uncommon compromise.
Their efforts were undermined, however, by Sen. Taft's stunning
death in late July. 52 Days later, when shocked employers learned
about the conciliatory scope of his secretly negotiated proposals,
these reforms stalled. 53
This history is relevant to the ULP strike doctrine because
among Taft-Hartley's draconian amendments, one provided that a
permanently replaced economic striker was ineligible to vote in an
election to decertify a union. 54 Throughout the late 1940s,15 and
151. See id.
152. See id,
153. See id. Aaron's detailed assessment provides this illuminating perspective:
Apparently, Durkin almost won the first round. A preliminary draft of the
Labor Department's amendments, embodying many of Taft's proposals, was on
the President's desk and reportedly on the point of being sent to Congress when
news of the Senator's death reached Washington on July 30. The presidential
message was never sent, but on August 3 the contents were published in the Wall
Street Journal. The disclosure shocked conservative business leaders and the
right wing of the Republican party. The President had been on the verge of
submitting a nineteen-point proposal, embodying a number of important
amendments favorable to labor.
Id.
154. When the Senate amended H.R. 3020, it included within the newly defined
procedures for decertifying a union a broad disqualification of strikers in such elections:
Only unfair labor practice strikers were made eligible to vote. See S. 1126, 80th Cong., §
9(c)(3) (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS Acr, 1947 at 99,119 (1974). The Senate bill provided:
No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within
which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been
held. Employees on strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall not be
eligible to vote unless such strike involves an unfair labor practice on the part of
the employer.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, section 9(c)(3) permanently replaced strikers who were completely disenfranchised,
from the first day that their replacement was employed. If this proposal had any
semblance of fairness, it implicitly adopted the ULP doctrine by tacitly acknowledging the
distinction between economic and ULP strikers. The Senate passed S. 1126, which
contained this provision, by a 68-24 margin on May 13, 1947 (93 Cong.Rec 3954 (1947),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr,
1947 at 99 at 1013 (1974)). Legislative treatment of ULP strikers changed again, however,
when the bill returned from conference, because the final language passed by the Congress
stripped even this protection afforded to ULP strikers. See 2 LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS Acr HISTORY, at 1522.
155. Democrats in the 80th Congress strongly objected to section 9(c)(3). Portraying
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lasting until the late 1950s,156 Democrats viewed this provision,
codified in section 9(c)(3), as pernicious to collective bargaining. It
discouraged employers from bargaining with unions, provided them
an incentive to provoke economic strikes, and rewarded them by
offering a union decertification election in which only permanent
replacements had the right to vote. In short, this policy seemed to
abuse Mackay Radio's assumption that the hiring of permanent
replacements was needed to maintain the employer's business.
Congress tempered this only slightly in 1959, when it amended
Section 9(c)(3) to make replaced strikers ineligible to vote in
the depth of this law's injury, Senator Pepper reflected on the following scenario:
Let us take, for example, a corporation of the State of West Virginia, we will say
a coal mine. If the workers of that mine strike because they are dissatisfied with
the wages they receive, the employer can recruit labor in West Virginia and put it
in the mine. Then he can notify the National Labor Relations Board that he
wants another election, and if there has not been an election in a year, he can get
an election, under the bill, and the only ones who can vote in the election are the
new employees, the strikebreakers, as it were. Of course, they will vote the old
union out and vote the new representation in, and the old union will be
effectively disposed of. So, under the bill all an employer has to do is to provoke
his workers to strike, recruit replacements, and put them in permanent status,
and call for an election..., and his new strikebreakers would elect new
representatives, and the old union would be effectively disposed of altogether.
93 Cong. Rec. 6686, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1974, at 1605,1606 (1974).
156. In a Senate Report on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (LMRDA), Senator John Kennedy gave a dramatic illustration of Sen. Pepper's
prophecy:
The unfairness of the rule can be demonstrated by many hypothetical examples.
But one recent dramatic instance is that involving the O'Sullivan Rubber Corp.'s
Winchester, Va., plant. In April 1956 the United Rubber Workers AFL-CIO was
certified to represent the production employees after a Board-conducted election
in which the union polled a majority 343 to 2. Thereafter O'Sullivan and the
union commenced negotiations. After more than a month of fruitless
negotiations, the union called a strike and all but 8 of the 420 employees in the
plant failed to report for work. Thereafter while some number of strikers
returned to work, the company undertook to recruit replacements. By July the
company had a total of 345 employees on the job, of whom 265 were new
employees and 72 returned strikers. Under these circumstances, normal
production was resumed. Picketing continued and so did fruitless negotiations;
the union indeed was in no position to exert any bargaining strength since the
plant was in full production. On April 27, 1957, approximately 1 year after the
first election the company filed for a new election. This election was held in
October 1957 and the results showed that 288 votes were cast against the union
and but 5 in its favor. The strikers were not permitted to vote pursuant to the
rule under section 9(c)(3).
1 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT, 1959, at 428-29 (1977).
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decertification elections after the first anniversary of their strike.157
MI. Judicial Role in The Apogee and Decline of the Unfair
Labor Practice Doctrine
A. The ULP Strike Doctrine at its Apogee
By adopting the ULP strike doctrine, the Mastro Plastics Court
signaled its disagreement with Taft-Hartley's policy that encouraged
employers to permanently break relations with unions by
disenfranchising replaced strikers through decertification elections.
The period 1947-1963 marked the apogee of the ULP strike doctrine.
The law reached its full extension in the Supreme Court's 1963
decision, NLRB v. Erie Resistor,58 which further insulated strikers
from permanent replacement.
In contrast to Mastro Plastics, Erie Resistor involved more typical
bargaining over a new labor agreement, where no worker protest
occurred. 159 When the company and union reached impasse, all 478
employees went on strike and the company tried to continue
operations by hiring permanent replacements.16° After this failed, the
company tried to induce strikers to cross the picket line and return to
work.' 6' Appealing to strikers was not per se unlawful, but the NLRB
deemed it a discriminatory practice when the company offered twenty
years of "super-seniority" only to returning strikers (also called
crossovers) and striker replacements. 162 Continuing strikers were not
provided this benefit,163 and consequently, crossovers were more
protected against layoffs that were determined by seniority. 164
This labor dispute exposed another rift among courts and the
157. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
see. 702, 73 Stat. 519, 542 [hereinafter Landrum-Griffin Act], reprinted in 1 N.L.R.B.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
AcT, 1959, at 1, 24 (1959).
158. 373 U. S. 221 (1963).
159. See id. at 222.
160. See id. at 222-23.
161. See id. at 223.
162. See id. at 225.
163. See id. at 223. As a result, the union was under "great pressure" and "offered to
give up some of its contract demands if the company would abandon super-seniority." Id.
at 224.
164. See id. at 223 n.3 (explaining that the company arrived at the 20-year figure by
projecting what its work force would be following the strike). At the time the strike
began, 450 employees were laid off, apart from the active work force that went on strike.
See id, at 222 n.2.
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NLRB in their treatment of striker-replacements and crossovers. In
adjudicating this case, the NLRB viewed the company's right to hire
permanent replacements as a sufficient counter-measure to
employees' right to strike.165  So, according to the Board, the
economic strike converted to a ULP strike when the company offered
preferential benefits only to replacements and crossovers.166
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals took a completely different
view when it denied enforcement to the Board's order.167 The court
was persuaded that the company had a legitimate business
justification to offer replacements and cross-overs super-seniofity.'68
This difference extended to other circuit courts.169
B. The Judiciary Erodes the ULP Strike Doctrine in the 1980s
Throughout the 1980s, the American labor movement was in a
full-scale retreat. Its influence in national politics waned, as the
percentage of union members in the workforce continued to
plummet. 70 By 1980, the AFL-CIO appeared out of touch with its
165. See id. at 225 (summarizing the Board's view that an employer's right to hire
permanent replacements under Mackay Radio could not be extended by also granting
employers the right to extend preferential benefits to replacements).
166. Id. at 226 n.5.
167. See International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 613, v. NLRB,
303 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1962).
168. See id. at 364, stating:
We are of the opinion that inherent in the right of an employer to replace strikers
during a strike is the concomitant right to adopt a preferential seniority policy
which will assure the replacements some form of tenure, provided the policy is
adopted SOLELY to protect and continue the business of the employer.
169. The Third Circuit's treatment of Erie Resistor was consistent with NLRB v.
Potlatch Forests, Inc., 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951) and NLRB v. Lewin-Mathes Co., 285
F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1960). This approach contrasted, however, with Ballas Egg Prods. v.
NLRB, 283 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1960), NLRB v. California Date Growers Ass'n, 259 F.2d
587 (9th Cir. 1958), Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 232 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1956),
and Swarco v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1962). The Olin Mathieson majority offered
this representative rationale for finding super-seniority plans discriminatory:
With a strike in progress, the primary concern of the employer is to keep his
plant in operation. It is then proper for an employer, who might be unable to
procure replacement save upon a promise of permanent tenure, to promise such
tenure to the replacements. But when the strike is over, when the plant is in
operation, then the imposition of the superseniority policy in favor of the
replacements and against the strikers quite a different matter.
232 F.2d at 161-2.
170. See Gary N. Chaison & Dileep G. Dhavale, A Note on the Severity of the Decline in
Union Organizing Activity, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 366, 369 tbl. 1, col. 2 (1990)
(Union Organizing Activity and Success in NLRB Representation Elections, 1975-87,
Number of Elections in New Units). Union representation elections for new units fell
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rank-and-file.17' These factors contributed to the election of
President Ronald Reagan, who hired permanent replacements to
break a strike by 11,000 air traffic controllers. 7 2 Eventually, the
NLRB 7 3 and the federal courts,174 swelled by a growing number of
Reagan-appointees, took a harder line against unions.
The stage was set for two changes in the ULP doctrine. The
most direct and significant change resulted from the Supreme Court's
ruling in TWA v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants. 75 By
ruling that an employer does not unlawfully discriminate against
strikers when it offers job-related perks only to strike crossovers, the
Supreme Court appeared to reverse Erie Resistor.
The other change occurred in the circuit courts. In the late
1980s, these courts narrowed an employer's duty to provide financial
information when unions requested this to verify a demand for
from 7,093 in 1975, 8,054 in 1976, and 8,212 in 1977, to 3,582 in 1985, 3,429 in 1986, and
3,331 in 1987. See id.
171. See Paul Starobin, Unions Turn to Grass Roots To Rebuild Hill Clout, 47 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REPORT 2249,12251 (Sept. 2, 1989), available in 1989 WL 3348596 at *3.
172. See e.g., Bob Baker, Ex-Air Traffic Controllers Recall Strike with Regret, L.A.
TIMES, July 27, 1991, at Al (reporting that President Reagan's firing of 11,000 striking
federal air traffic controllers still ripples through American society.) Labor analysts
regard Reagan's tough stand against PATCO, the union involved in this strike, as being a
catalyst for "American management's increasingly aggressive tactics against unions." Id
As Baker reports, prior to PATCO's strike, "the [federal] government had maintained a
relatively tolerant attitude. Postal workers and controllers had struck in isolated instances
with no mass firings. PATCO, operating with the traditional mentality of organized labor,
planned its strike as a quick show of muscle that would shut down a substantial amount of
the nation's airline traffic and cause passenger outrage. The union expected to be
bloodied with fines and suspensions but figured it could force the FAA to bend on
contract issues. Wrong." Id
173. See Laurence J. Cohen, New Bargaining Approaches to New Economic Conditions:
Pursuing a Mutuality of Interests, 5 LAB. LAW. 263, 264 (1989) ("[Fjrom the standpoint of
the labor movement, we have faced an overtly hostile government, in attitude and actions
towards unions and workers, unparalleled in our lifetime. The Reagan Labor Board,
particularly during the 1983-86 Dotson-Hunter era, was one of the most visible forms of
the governmental approach of the Reagan Administration .... "). A differing but
informative view appears in Jay S. Siegel, A New Labor-Policy Consensus, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 4, 1985, at A24; and Paul Alan Levy, The Unidimensional Perspective of the Reagan
Labor Board, 16 RUTGERS LJ. 269, 269 (1985) ("[I]n the three years since President
Reagan's appointees began to join the Board, there has been an unprecedented assault on
this country's labor laws.").
174. See Aaron Epstein, Study Contradicts Dole, Says Judges Appointed by Clinton Are
Moderate, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 12, 1996, at 7 (The author reported
political science research that rated presidential appointees by decisional liberal-ness
(Nixon's, 39%; Ford's, 44%; Carter's, 53%; Reagan, 36%; Bush, 37%; and Clinton, 46%).
The study included labor law decisions in its measurement.).
175. 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
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concessions. These cases appeared to involve employer provocation
of a strike, with the apparent intent of providing an opportunity to
hire permanent replacements. By constricting an employer's
disclosure duty, thus reducing the possibility of finding that a ULP
caused a strike, courts were able to rule that these strikes were
economic.
(1) TWA v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
The flight attendants union and TWA bargained for two years
over a new labor agreement before reaching impasse in 1986.176 On
March 7, the union went out on strike.77 TWA responded by hiring
2,350 new attendants as permanent replacements. 178 Since there were
about 5,000 strikers, this hiring was insufficient to maintain the
airline's normal operations. 179
To run a normal schedule during the strike, the company asked
strikers to abandon their walkout and return to work. Strikers were
told that job vacancies would be filled by applying the seniority
bidding system to all working flight attendants.180 To increase the
appeal of this offer, job and domicile assignments based on this
bidding order would remain effective after the strike ended.181
TWA's plan created an incentive for low-seniority (also called
"junior") employees to return immediately to work. They could
leapfrog over more senior flight attendants to acquire better flights
and domiciles. 182 They would also be more protected from layoffs.183
At the same time, TWA's plan induced senior attendants to
return to work, to protect their place in the bid system from junior
crossovers.184 This was insidious because this arrangement remained
in effect after the strike ended.185 Thus, "at the conclusion of the
strike, senior full-term strikers would not be permitted to displace
permanent replacements or junior nonstriking flight attendants and
could be left without an opportunity to return to work.' 86
On the surface, this plan differed from Erie Resistor's super-
176. See id. at 429.
177. See iii





183. See id- at 429.




seniority offer because TWA allowed seniority to accrue for full-term
strikers and never granted crossovers an artificial number of years to
count toward seniority.187 But, by allowing junior crossovers a one-
time opportunity to leapfrog permanently over senior co-workers
who remained on strike, TWA's plan had the effect of Erie Resistor.
Having lost the strike, the Union made an unconditional offer on
May 17 to return to work.188 By then, the airline operated by
employing approximately 1,280 nonstriking flight attendants and
hiring approximately 2,350 new flight attendants. 189 When the strike
started, the union represented 5,000 flight attendants, but lost about
half of those positions to the replacements. 19°
When strike ended, the union sought immediate reinstatement of
2,967 strikers who were permanently replaced or displaced by junior
crossovers.191 After two years TWA reinstated only 1,100 additional
full-term strikers.192 Thus, the union relied on Mastro Plastics in
contending that TWA's discrimination against full-term strikers
converted this economic strike to a ULP strike.93
By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. 9 4 In
the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor said the union was arguing for
an impermissible expansion of Erie Resistor.95 In analyzing the ULP
strike issue, the Erie Resistor Court focused on whether the
employer's grant of super-seniority to crossovers was necessary to run
its business. 196 Breaking from this inquiry, Justice O'Connor focused






191. See Independent. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. TWA, 643 F. Supp. 470, 471-72
(W.D. Mo. 1986) (summing the three classes of employees allegedly displacing strikers).
192. See id at 431.
193. See iL at 430.
194. See id. at 428. (Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Justices Rehnquist,
White, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justices Brennan's dissent was joined by Justice
Marshall. Justice Blackmun's dissent was joined by Justice Brennan.)
195. See iL at 436.
196. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221,232 (1963):
We have no intention of questioning the continuing vitality of the Mackay
rule, but we are not prepared to extend it to the situation we have here. To do so
would require us to set aside the Board's considered judgment that the Act and
its underlying policy require, in the present context, giving more weight to the
harm wrought by super-seniority than to the interest of the employer in
operating its plant during the strike by utilizing this particular means of attracting
replacements.
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To distinguish crossovers from new hires in the manner (the union)
proposes would have the effect of penalizing those who decided not
to strike in order to benefit those who did. Because permanent
replacements need not be discharged at the conclusion of a strike in
which the union has been unsuccessful, a certain number of
prestrike employees will find themselves without work. We see no
reason why those employees who chose not to gamble on the
success of the strike should suffer the consequences when the
gamble proves unsuccessful. 97
In short, by focusing on the individual employee's decision to
strike or work, Justice O'Connor ignored how TWA's plan would stir
resentment among workers years after the strike ended. Justice
Brennan's dissent was acutely sensitive to this, however. Post-strike
tensions, already high because TWA's workforce was composed of
striker replacements and some reinstated strikers, would grow as
antagonisms renewed between strikers and the crossovers who
personally benefitted by taking the strikers' seniority-related
benefits.198
The majority's ruling also undermined the inherent fairness in
rewarding length of service.199 And in a passage that reflected the
generation gap between Brennan and O'Connor, the senior Justice
expressed a pass6 policy preference: "I would favor-and I believe
Congress has provided for-the rule that errs on the side of preferring
solidarity ..... mo
The potential impact of the majority opinion on collective
bargaining was immediately evident.201 The decision meant that full-
term TWA strikers were ineligible for immediate reinstatement
197. TWA, 489 U.S. at 438.
198. See id. at 448.
199. Justice Brennan observed:
The principle of seniority is based on the notion that it is those employees who
have worked longest in an enterprise and therefore have most at stake whose
jobs should be most protected. Permitting the employer to give preference to
crossovers... will mean that an employee of only six months' experience, who
abandoned the strike one day before it ended, could displace a 20-year veteran
who chose to remain faithful to the decision made collectively with her fellow
workers until the group as a whole decided to end the strike.
Id. at 451.
200. Id. at 452.
201. See Michael A. Verespej, Striking Out; Unions' Most Powerful Weapon Could
Frequently Blow up in Their Faces, Thanks to a Supreme Court Ruling, INDUS. WK.,
March 20, 1989, at 72. Prominent management attorney, G. John Tysse, commented,
"There is no way you can sugarcoat the Supreme Court's decision. It clearly affects the
strike as an economic weapon." Id. Stephen Schlossberg of the International Labor
Organization noted, "Unions will clearly have to think about alternative strategies to bring
pressure against companies.... ." Id.
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because of the Mackay Radio doctrine. In Justice O'Connor's terms,
they paid dearly for their lost gamble by remaining out of work for
several years.2 2 Meanwhile, TWA avoided backpay valued at $55
million.203 More generally, other large employers who experienced
strikes applied the lessons of TWA. 2°4 Finally, in ensuing replacement
strikes, the work force was more conflicted than usual because post-
strike work forces divided into three warring groups: permanent
replacements, crossovers, and full-term strikers who were eventually
reinstated. 205
(2) Curtailment of Truitt's Information-Disclosure Requirement
Throughout the 1980s, unions were besieged by employer
demands for concessions.206 Frequently, they resisted. If a union
202. See, e.g., Tom Incantalupo, Rescue Plan: Will it Fly? NEWSDAY, Nov. 23, 1992, at
23. Incantalupo reported that a full-term, replaced striker, Barry Schimmel, was not
reinstated for three years; "To be out on the street with a wife and two kids-one of which
was a six-month old infant... [i]t took me a while to get back on my feet again and find a
job." Id. Another replaced flight attendant reported that she was nearly evicted twice
from her apartment while she was out of work with TWA. See id.
203. See James Vicini, Top Court Deals Blow to Unions Favors Those Who Cross Picket
Lines, THE RECORD N. N.J., March 1,1989, at Dl.
204. See Bob Bouyea, NLRB Cites Cat on Superseniority, PEORIA J. STAR, May 26,
1993, at Al, PEORIA J. STAR (May 26, 1993) (Caterpillar cited by NLRB for offering
seniority-based inducements to strike-crossovers).
205. See Anne Scott, And the Bitterness Goes On, Bus. REC. (IOWA), Jan. 29,1997, at 8
(reporting that even after a bitter strike was settled, tensions continued to simmer). To
illustrate, before the strike, there were 1,350 union members in Bridgestone's Des Moines
plant and only two non-member employees. See id. As a result of hiring permanent
replacements and attracting crossovers, only 650 strikers employees remained union
members. See id. The article implies that the plant's 350 crossovers and 450 replacement
workers are not members. See id. As evidence of the tension in union-management
relations, one union leader summed it this way, "Before the strike... management had an
open door policy, and union and management regularly met to discuss issues and
problems. Those discussions aren't happening now. Right now, the only time we deal
with them is on disciplinary stuff." Id.
206. See Charles Craypo, Meatpacking: Industry Restructuring and Union Decline, in
CONTEMPORARY COLLECrIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 63 (Paula Voos
ed., 1994) (detailing concessionary bargaining in meatpacking industry); Isaac Cohen,
Political Climate and Two Airline Strikes: Century Air in 1932 and Continental Airlines in
1983-85, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 308 (Jan. 1990) (discussing impact of deregulation
on airline strike in the 1980s); Clifford B. Donn, Concession Bargaining in The Ocean-
Going Maritime Industry, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 189 (1989) (analyzing
concessionary bargaining in maritime industry); Leslie Nay, The Determinants of
Concession Bargaining in The Airline Industry, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 307 (Jan.
1991) (statistical analysis of airline deregulation in the 1980s); Lynda Gorov, Once-
Demanding Labor Unions Now Celebrate Small Gains, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 8, 1985,
at 14 (discussing union concessions in the mid-1980s); Dave Hage, P-9 Strike Grew out of
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granted concessions to one large employer in an industry with
significant union representation, it was vulnerable to similar cost-
saving demands from other employers. 207 Even if union leaders
understood an employer's need for relief, a proposal might be so
harsh that a union representative would be imperiled by presenting it
to the membership.2 08 This context is necessary to understand how
the federal courts' reinterpretation of Truitt disclosure requirements
also curtailed the ULP strike doctrine.2 09
United Steelworkers, Local Union 14534 v. NLRB210 is a case in
point. In negotiations for a new contract, the employer proposed a
30% reduction in wages and a 50% reduction in medical insurance
and vacations.211 The union was willing to consider these extreme
concessions, but only if the company could justify them by
demonstrating need.212 Thus, the union requested that the employer
disclose its finances. 213 The company refused this request, terminated
negotiations after four meetings with the union, and unilaterally
implemented its offer.214 The union went on strike when the
agreement expired on March 21, 1987.215 The company immediately
Industry's Money Troubles, STAR TRIB., Aug. 29, 1986, at 5B (reporting on Geo. Hormel's
severe bargaining proposals); and Ralph E. Winter, New Givebacks: Even Profitable Firms
Press Workers to Take Permanent Pay Cuts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1984, at Al (explaining
general aspects of declining union bargaining power in the early 1980s).
207. Dana Priest, Striking Coal Miners Fear End Of Union, Way of Life in Va., THE
WASHINGTON POST, July 6,1989, at C1, (The author summarized this phenomenon in the
coal industry: "In recent years the union has given concessions-nonconforming
agreements-to some coal companies in an effort to keep them as signatories to the
national agreement. Some industry analysts say this opened the door for companies to
demand even more concessions from the union.").
208. In the midst of negotiating over an employer proposal to reduce jobs in a
bargaining unit at International Paper, a local union leader said, "[D]o you think that we
are going to give up 280 jobs? We want to stay alive. You're going to get us killed."
International Paper, 319 N.L.R.B. 1257 (1995).
209. In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956), a union requested some
form of financial substantiation for the company's claim that it could not afford the
union's proposed pay increase. In denying the union's request for this information, the
company said "'the information.., is not pertinent to this discussion and the company
declines to give you such information; [y]ou have no legal right to such." Id at 150-51.
The Court agreed with the NLRB that "a refusal to attempt to substantiate a claim of
inability to pay increased wages may support a finding of a failure to bargain in good
faith." Id.
210. 983 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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countered by hiring permanent replacements.
216
The importance of the ULP-economic strike distinction is plainly
evident in this case. As of April 8, 1993, when the appeals court
issued its amended decision, strikers had not been reinstated even
though they offered unconditionally to return to work on July 30,
1987.217 Due to a change in how the courts interpreted Truitt
disclosure requirements, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
a company's claim of "competitive disadvantage" during contract
negotiations is legally different from a claim of "inability to pay.
218
Thus, the company did not breach its duty to bargain by refusing to
provide the union this information.219 The court, therefore, rejected
the union's contention that this was a ULP strike, 20 and ruled that
the strike was economic.221
This policy change was a potentially significant development in
collective bargaining because it linked employer demands for difficult
concessions, and a narrower duty to disclose financial information, to
a reduced basis for finding that a strike is caused by an employer's
ULP. Moreover, the potential impact for change was widespread. In
addition to the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth,22z Seventh223 and Tenth2
24
circuits adopted this approach. Eventually, NLRB decisions followed
these precedents. 2
216. See id. at 242-43.
217. See id. at 247.
218. See id.. at 244-45.
219. See i. at 245.
220. See it at 246 (observing that in an earlier proceeding, an administrative law judge
had ruled in favor of the union's contention "that the strike was a 'direct result' of the
Company's unlawful refusal to provide the requested cost data and its overall failure to
bargain in good faith" ).
221. See idt at 247 (concluding that "the employees were economic rather than unfair
labor practice strikers").
222. See Washington Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333,1338-39 (4th Cir. 1986).
223. See Graphic Communications Int'l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168 (7th
Cir. 1992) (employer had no duty to share cost information with union, and therefore had
right to hire permanent striker replacements). The Seventh Circuit reinterpreted Truitt in
NLRB v. Harvstone Manufacturing Corp. See 785 F.2d 570,575-76 (7th Cir. 1986).
224. See Facet Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1990).
225. See Conagra, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 944, 955 (1996); International Paper & United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, 319 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1265 (1995); Genstar Stone Prods. Co., 317
N.L.R.B. 1293, 1293 (1995); Orthodox Jewish Homes for the Aged, 314 N.L.R.B. 1006,
1008 (1994); Fairhaven Properties, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 763, 769 (1994); S & F Enters., Inc.,
312 N.L.R.B. No. 770, 789-90 (1993); A.W. Schlesinger Geriatric Center & SEIU Local
Union 706, 304 N.L.R.B. 296 (1991); Nielson Lithographing Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 697, 699
(1991); Mohawk Liquer Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1087 (1990); Whittier Area Parents' Ass'n
for the Developmentally Handicapped, 296 N.L.R.B. 817 (1989); Gas Spring Co., 296
N.L.R.B. 84, 85 (1989); General Elec. Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 146, 155-60 (1989); Accurate Die
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C. Institutional Signaling and Implicit Bargains as the ULP Strike Doctrine
Narrowed
In three key decisions during the 1980s, the Supreme Court
strongly signaled its desire to curb the right to strike. These decisions
exemplify Eskridge and Frickey's assessment that the Rehnquist
Court has a "dominant ideology... in labor cases [that] reveals tight
fists around management obligations to workers." 226 More generally,
these cases support Eskridge and Frickey's central thesis that the
"decisions are only comprehensible if viewed as a complex amalgam
of rule-of-law and substantive values applied selectively by a strategic
Court."227 These cases also show that the Court strategically avoids
conflict with the other branches.228
(1) The First Signal: Belknap v. Hale
TWA had the most direct impact on the ULP strike doctrine, but
it was the last in this series. Belknap v. Hale,229 a 1983 decision,
concerned a strike in which the employer ran a typical newspaper ad
to attract permanent replacements.23 0 Successful applicants signed a
document stating: "I, the undersigned, acknowledge and agree that I
as of this date have been employed by Belknap, Inc. at its Louisville,
Kentucky, facility as a regular full time permanent replacement to
permanently replace - in the job classification of_ _ "231
Pressured, however, by the NLRB to settle the strike, Belknap
eventually reinstated the strikers and fired replacements23 2 Twelve
former replacement workers sued Belknap for $500,000 in damages,
Casting Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 284,300-04 (1989); Facet Enters., Inc. 290 N.L.R.B. 152 (1988);
Gilberton Coal Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 344, 344-345 (1988); Coast Engraving Co., Inc., 282
N.L.R.B. 1236, 1251 (1987); Richmond Recording Corp., 280 N.L.R.B. 615, 644-45 (1987);
Washington Materials, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 839 (1986).
226. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 63.
227. Id. at 30.
228. See id at 76.
229. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
230. A large number of applicants responded to this advertisement:
Permanent employees wanted. Belknap, Inc., 111 East Main Street, Louisville,
Kentucky. Openings available for qualified persons looking for employment to
permanently replace striking warehouse and maintenance employees. Excellent
earnings, fringe benefits and working conditions with steady year-round
employment. Minimum starting rate $4.55 per hour. Top rate $5.85, depending
on skill, ability and experience. Plus incentive earnings over hourly rate for most
jobs....
Id. at 494 n.1.
231. Id. at 494-95.
232. See id. at 495-96.
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claiming breach of contract for permanent employment. 3  The
majority opinion, authored by Justice White, ruled that the NLRA
did not preempt the replacement workers' breach-of-contract
claims.234
Justice Brennan's lengthy dissent attacked this novel ruling
because it would likely undermine the strike-settlement process? 5
He believed the ruling created a strong financial disincentive to
dismiss replacements in order to reinstate strikers. In Brennan's
view, these replacement workers' breach-of-contract claims "go to the
core of federal labor policy. If respondents are allowed to pursue
their claims in state court, employers will be subject to potentially
conflicting state and federal regulation of their activities .... ,,236 This,
in turn, would undermine "the efficient administration of the
National Labor Relations Act" and disrupt "the structure of the
economic weapons Congress has provided to parties to a labor
dispute." 237  In short, the ruling created intolerable potential for
conflicting state and federal regulation of the right to strikeP
8
Nothing would accentuate this possibility more than the ULP
strike doctrine, because if the NLRB later ruled that Belknap's unfair
labor practice caused the strike, Belknap would be ordered to
reinstate the strikers.239  Brennan quoted Judge Learned Hand at
233. Id. at 496-97.
234. See id. at 512.
235. In a concurrence, Justice Blackmun stated a similar view-
The Court's conditional promise achieves only one thing: it permits an employer,
during settlement negotiations with the union, to threaten to retain permanent
employees in preference to returning strikers despite the fact that the employer
has not promised to do so. The naked interest in making such a threat, silently
endorsed in the Court's opinion, could not be less legitimate under the NLRA.
From the employer's point of view, one benefit of offering strike replacements
permanent employment is that strikers become fearful that they will lose their
jobs. But it is clear that creating this fear, which discourages union membership
and concerted activities, is a deleterious side-effect of, rather than a legitimate
business justification for, the power to hire permanent strike replacements.
Id. at 516 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
236. Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. Id.
238. See id. at 530.
239. Id. at 541-42, stating:
The real problem in this case, and another factor that supports preemption, is
that the words "permanent replacement" have a special meaning within the
context of federal labor law .... Workers hired to replace striking employees on
a permanent basis are non-permanent to the extent that a strike may be
determined to have been an unfair labor practice strike and that an employer
may be ordered to reinstate strikers.
Brennan added: "They are also non-permanent to the extent that a union may 'win' a
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length to underscore the ruling's harm to this settled doctrine.240
Without any explanation, the majority brushed off this concern,
stating that "had the strike been adjudicated an unfair labor practice
strike Belknap would have been required to reinstate the
strikers .... "241
(2) The Second Signal: Pattern Makers League v. NLRB
Two years later, the Supreme Court continued its assault on
strikes in Pattern Makers League v. NLRB.242 Here, a union
conducted an economic strike against an employer association for
several months.243 When its membership voted to reject a proposed
contract settlement, eleven members tendered their resignations from
the union and crossed-over to return to work.244 However, union
bylaws prohibited members from resigning during a strike.245
Consequently, the union fined these crossovers an amount equal to
their wages for working during part of the strike.246
The employer association filed a charge with the Board claiming
that the union's fines violated the crossovers' Section 8(b)(1)(A)
rights.247 The Board upheld these charges, and the Court affirmed the
Seventh Circuit's enforcement of the Board's ruling.248
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell reasoned that the
prohibition in Section 8(b)(1)(A) against union restraint or coercion
is purely an extension of the NLRA's Section 7 guarantee of an
employee's right to refrain from union activities: "When employee
members of a union refuse to support a strike (whether or not a rule
prohibits returning to work during a strike), they are refraining from
'concerted activity.' Therefore, imposing fines on these employees
for returning to work 'restrain(s)' the exercise of their section 7
strike and force an employer to agree to a settlement that requires the reinstatement of
striking employees."
240. See id. at 543, (quoting Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 871 (2nd Cir. 1938)).
241. Id at 511.
242. 473 U. S. 95 (1985).
243. See id at 97.
244. See id. at 95.
245. See id. at 96.
246. See id. at 98.
247. Id. Section 8(b)(1)(A) states that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization... to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section (7) .... ." Importantly, the section continues: "Provided, That this paragraph shall
not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A).
248. See Pattern Makers League, 473 U.S. at 100.
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rights. '249 Powell also wrote that "fining employees to enforce
compliance with any union rule or policy would violate the Act."250
This was careless because he failed to give any effect to the
exemption in Section 8(b)(1)(A) for internal union discipline. 251
Justice Blackmun's dissent was alert to this key oversight,
observing that the majority opinion proscribed all discipline, "no
matter how limited and no matter how reasonable." 2  He reasoned
that effective collective bargaining depended to some degree on a
union's ability to impose discipline on its members during duress:
"Unless internal rules can be enforced, the union's status as
bargaining representative will be eroded, and the rights of members
to act collectively will be jeopardized. ' 23
This reasoning acknowledged that a strike imposes at least short
term costs on members that the union hopes will be recouped. Thus,
high-minded notions of solidarity are likely to be undercut as
individual strikers feel pinched to return to work:
Union activity, by its very nature, is group activity, and is grounded
on the notion that strength can be garnered from unity, solidarity,
and mutual commitment. This concept is of particular force during
a strike, where the individual members of the union draw strength
from the commitments of fellow members, and where the activities
carried on by the union rest fundamentally on the mutual reliance
that inheres in the "pact" (citation omitted).5 4
Blackmun also sharply criticized the majority's failure to account
for the legislative history of Section 8(b)(1)(A).255 When Congress
enacted the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, it expressly
distinguished permissible and impermissible forms of union discipline
of members.Z6 When Congress amended Section 7 to provide
employees a right to refrain from union activities, it meant to prohibit
unions and their supporters from coercing nonmember employees
into joining.257
249. Id. at 101.
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. The section continues: "Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A).
252. Pattern Makers League, 473 U.S. at 117-18.
253. Id at 118.
254. Id. at 118-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409
U.S. 213,221 (1972)).
255. See id. at 121-22.
256. See id. at 122 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep't. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 30 (1947)).
257. See id
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Blackmun correctly observed, however, that "[t]here is no
suggestion that the House considered the right to refrain to include
the right to abandon an agreed-upon undertaking at will .... .258 In a
separate provision, the House attempted to regulate a union's
internal membership rules, but Blackmun noted that the Senate
specifically rejected this part of the Hartley bill.2 9 In fact, Sen. Taft
stated that the "Senate conferees refused to agree to the inclusion...
since they felt that it was unwise to authorize an agency of the
Government to undertake such elaborate policing of the internal
affairs of unions as this section contemplated without further study of
the structure of unions."26°
Applying this clear legislative history to the Pattern Makers' fine
of strike crossovers, Blackmun concluded that Congress never
intended that Section 8(b)(1) would prohibit unions from imposing
reasonable restrictions against member resignations during strikes.261
(3) The Court's 1980s Strike Decisions Fit Eskridge and Frickey's "Strategic"
Actor Theory
The Supreme Court's recasting of the right to strike, including its
makeover of the ULP strike doctrine in TWA, fits the theoretical
model of Law as Equilibrium. This theory realistically accounts for
the fact that Supreme Court justices "ordinarily include at least some
politically well-connected insiders who reflect the ideology of the
current governing coalition. '262 When justices embrace "ideologies
(that) conflict with the current governing coalition" they tend to be
"fearful of overrides and other forms of discipline from other
258. Id.
259. See id. at 122-23 ("It is critical to an understanding of the Taft-Hartley bill,
therefore, to recognize that the Senate explicitly rejected the House bill's §§ 7(b) and 8(c)
... [because] it decided that 'the formulation of a code of rights for individual members of
trade unions... should receive more extended study by a special joint congressional
committee."') (quoting S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947)).
260. Id. at 123 (quoting Sen. Taft at 93 Cong. Rec. 6443 (1947)).
261. Blackmun noted that under section 7 of the NLRA, the crossovers were not
compelled to join this union; but when they joined voluntarily, they agreed to this
restriction against resignation. See id. at 122. Thus, the rule "stands for the proposition
that to become a union member one must be willing to incur a certain obligation upon
which others may rely ...." Id. at 120-21. Blackmun also took care in pointing out this
non-coercive element of the union's bylaws: "League Law 13 does not in any way affect
the relationship between the employee and the employer. An employee who violates the
rule does not risk losing his job, and the union cannot seek an employer's coercive
assistance in collecting any fine that is imposed." Id. at 121.
262. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 53.
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institutions. '263 As the following analysis shows, the majority bloc
that reinterpreted the right to strike was attuned to a changing
ideological tide that elevated individual rights over collective rights.
Table 1 summarizes voting blocs among justices who participated
in all of these decisions. Ideological cleavage is evident in Justice
O'Connor and Rehnquist's consistent recasting of the right to strike,
and in Brennan and Marshall's steady opposition. Justice White
actually belongs in the O'Connor-Rehnquist bloc because he varied
only in his Pattern Makers concurrence. This was philosophically
consistent, however, with the majority opinion.264 In similar fashion,
Justice Blackmun belongs in the Brennan-Marshall bloc because he
left only once, in an oddly equivocal concurrence in Belknap.265
While the appearance of bloc-voting in Table 1 suggests
ideological cleavage, this is proof is only preliminary.266 But this
impression is strengthened by textual evidence of ideological tension
and personal in-fighting. The caustic nature of the following dissents
indicate the Court's destabilizing consensus on striker replacement
policy.
263. Id.
264. See Pattern Makers League, 473 U.S. at 115. White began his short concurrence by
saying, "I agree with the Court that the Board's construction of §§ 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) is a
permissible one and should be upheld." Id. at 116.
265. See Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 522 (1983). Blackmun believed that if "federal
law recognizes that the employer voluntarily has undertaken an obligation to the
replacements, the fact that the employer commits an unfair labor practice making it
impossible for him to fulfill that obligation should not shield the employer from
compensating the replacement employees." Id. He waffled, however, when he continued:
I fully recognize that this view may appear to put the employer between Scylla
and Charybdis. Neither the Court's approach, nor the dissent's, however,
provides the employer with a safer harbor ....
Although I cannot believe that Congress has reconciled the conflict between the
striker's right to reinstatement and the employer's right to operate its business
during a strike by requiring lies and broken promises to strike replacements to go
unredressed, Congress certainly is free to prove me wrong. Congress also is free
to resolve the great tensions inherent in this complex three-way struggle entirely
within the framework of federal law.
Id.
266. However, for a similar analysis involving this bloc's role in curbing Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, see William P. Murphy, Supreme Court Review, 5 LAB. LAW. 679,
679-80 (1989) ("Retreat is now being sounded by a new Supreme Court majority of five
Justices based on three Reagan appointees. In the absence of any congressional
amendments, and in disregard of its own precedents, the Court... reached out to cripple
major legal tools for eliminating discrimination and its effects.").
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Table 1
Supreme Court Voting Blocs:
Justices Who Participated in Belknap, Pattern Makers, and TWA
(* Denotes Author of Majority Opinion)
Belknap Pattern Makers TWA (1989)
(1983) (1985)





Dissent Brennan Blackmun (Brennan, Brennan





The Court's change in the law of permanency weakens the rights of
strikers and undermines the protection afforded those rights by the
Act. Such adjustments in the balance of power between labor and
management are for Congress, not this Court.267
It might be a better world if strike replacements were afforded
greater protection. But if accomplishing this end requires an
alteration of the balance of power between labor and management
or an erosion of the right to strike, this Court should not pursue it.
This Court's notions of what would constitute a more "fair" system
are irrelevant to determining whether certain state law claims must
be preempted because they interfere with the system of labor-
management relations established by Congress.268
Excerpts from Pattern Makers
Today the Court supinely defers to a divided-vote determination by
the National Labor Relations Board that a union commits an unfair
labor practice when it enforces a worker's promise to his fellow
workers not to resign from his union and return to work during a
strike, even though the worker freely made the decision to join the
union and freely made the promise not to resign at such a time, and
267. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 540-41.
268. Id. at 543.
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even though union members democratically made the decision to
strike in full awareness of that promise.269
In the face of this substantial legislative history indicating that the
House provisions were rejected on the merits, the Court's
treatment of that history... is both inaccurate and inadequate.270
The Court, however, again ignores the distinction between internal
and external rules fashioned in its prior cases, and so
misunderstands the concept "voluntary unionism" implicated by
the Act. 271
[The Court] reaches this conclusion by giving the proviso a
cramped reading. . . ignoring in the process both the plain meaning
and the legislative history of the proviso. Further, the Court never
addresses the fact that the rule is a prerequisite of union
membership much like any other internal union rule. Indeed, the
Court entirely fails to explain why League Law 13 is not a rule
"with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership," even
given its own enervating understanding of the proviso.272
The Court's reasoning is obviously circular: enforcement of a union
rule prohibiting resignation during a strike is different from
enforcement of other union rules because it violates policies of
voluntary unionism. It violates those policies because it works an
infringement on employment rights. It works an infringement on
employment rights because it imposes fines. And these fines are
impermissible while fines for violation of other union rules are
appropriate because the rule here violates voluntary unionism.273
In sum, the Court defers to the Board although the Board's
position cannot fairly be said to rest on any principled application
of the policies of our national labor laws.274
By focusing exclusively on the right to refrain from collective
action, by assuming an arid and artificial conception of the proviso
circumscribing that right, and by ignoring Congress' intentions in
promulgating the NLRA in the first instance, the Board and the
Court abandon their proper role as mediators between any
conflicting interests protected by the labor laws. 275
The conclusion that freedom under the NLRA means freedom to
break a freely made promise to one's fellow workers after they
have relied on that promise to their detriment is not only a notion
at odds with the structure and purpose of our labor law, but is an
269. Pattern Makers League, 473 U.S. at 117 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 123.
271. Id. at 126.
272. Id. at 121.
273. 1& at 127 n.3.
274. Id. at 130.
275. 1& at 133.
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affront to the autonomy of the American worker.276
Excerpts from TWA
More fundamental, I fear, is the legal mistake inherent in the
Court's objection to "penalizing those who decided not to strike in
order to benefit those who did." The Court, of course, does
precisely the opposite: it allows TWA to single out for penalty
precisely those employees who were faithful to the strike until the
end, in order to benefit those who abandoned it. What is
unarticulated is the Court's basis for choosing one position over the
other. If indeed one group or the other is to be "penalized," what
basis does the Court have for determining that it should be those
who remained on strike rather than those who returned to work? I
see none, unless it is perhaps an unarticulated hostility toward
strikes.277
Whatever may have been the "primary" purpose of § 2 Fourth, it is
too late in the day to suggest that this provision, at least when read
in the context of the entire RLA, does not prohibit employer
coercion of the right to strike. The Court compounds its error in
regard to the reach of § 2 Fourth with a more fundamental mistake
when it appears to assume that the employer's action in this case is
sanctioned by the mere fact that it occurred during the "self-help"
stage of the dispute.278
While of course the National Labor Relations Act cannot be
imported wholesale into the railway labor arena, we have
frequently referred to the NLRA for assistance in construing the
Railway Labor Act. Given the paucity of RLA precedent on the
specific issue before us, the Court quite properly looks to the
NLRA for guidance. It arrives at an incorrect conclusion, however,
because it mischaracterizes the employer's action and because it
appears unwilling to take seriously the protection Congress has
seen fit to afford to the right to strike.
279
These excerpts mark the passing of a retiring generation of
justices whose values were shaped by laws such as the NLRA. Labor
felt this decline several years before the Court, when its 1977 and
1978 legislative initiatives were stunningly defeated.28 This
276. ld.
277. TWA v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 447 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. Id at 444.
279. Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
280. See Paul Starobin, Unions Turn to Grass Roots To Rebuild Hill Clout, 47 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP'T (1989) 2249 (reporting that the House, in 1977, surprisingly rejected a bill
to broaden union picketing rights at construction sites). In that vote, 37 of 68 House
freshmen voted against the bill, including 13 who received election help from the AFL-
CIO. In 1978, a filibuster defeated a bill that would have made organizing easier for
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inexorable trend became clear in the 1980 elections, when union
members deserted the AFL-CIO in amazing numbers281 and a sea
change in the presidential and congressional politics282 paved the way
for a more conservative judiciary.
Belknap, Pattern Makers, and TWA were mileposts in this
climatic change, as the Court evolved to fulfill a more conformist role
as a coordinate branch. On this road to change, the Court was deeply
conflicted, as the foregoing evidence shows; but then, so was the
Congress, as it came very close to enacting legislation to repeal
Mackay Radio and TWA. 283 In sum, the evolution of the ULP strike
doctrine through the 1980s was part of the Court's broader strategic
movement toward a new equilibrium which increasingly marginalized
union interests.
IV. The Frequency of ULP Strikes, 1938-1999: Statistical
Evidence of Law as Equilibrium
A. The ULP Strike as a Unit of Analysis to Test the "Law as Equilibrium"
Thesis
Law is the product of complex interactions among the coordinate
branches of government. The Supreme Court tries to balance its
conflicting roles as a neutral arbiter that must "preserve the integrity
of its institutional character, as well as its special position in American
society,"284 while indulging its natural inclination to read "the
Constitution, statutes, and common law precedents in light of its own
specific policy preferences or its general network of beliefs and
attitudes."m
Eskridge and Frickey attribute a precise meaning to equilibrium
in this framework. Law is a distillate, a rule or policy that is
unions. See id.
281. The American Labor Movement Faces a Real Time of Reckoning, THE ARKANSAS
GAZETrE, Feb. 7, 1985, located at 1985 WL 4412982 (reporting that Walter Mondale
received only 55 per cent of the vote in union households even though the AFL-CIO
denounced President Reagan as a champion of "scab-herders and union-busters").
282. See Taylor E. Dark, Organized Labor and the Congressional Democrats:
Reconsidering the 1980s, 111 POL. SC. Q. 83, 85-86 (1996) (summarizing these changes as
"the thorough political repudiation of the previous Democratic administration, a major
Republican victory in the presidential election, Republican control over the Senate for the
first time since 1954, the defeat of prominent liberal Democratic senators, and a gain of
thirty-five Republican seats in the House").
283. See infra notes 321-329.
284. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 34.
285. Id
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constantly filtered, refined, recast, and refiltered by interactions
involving the coordinate branches.286 When Eskridge and Frickey say
that "law is an equilibrium," they mean it is "a state of balance among
competing forces or institutions."28
Eskridge and Frickey's idea that the Court acts strategically
because of its interdependence with Congress and agencies flows
naturally from the checks-and-balances structure that the
constitutional framers intended. They see agencies as "the most
reliable barometers of political equilibria" 8 and explain that the
Court usually defers to agencies because they are "knowledgeable
about and responsive to presidential and congressional
preferences." 289
Also, because agencies are the first government organ to address
most interpretive issues, "they are usually able to anticipate the
responses of other national institutions accurately enough to avoid
overrides."' 29°  In short, agencies provide efficient and low-cost
information to the Court about any given policy risk that "carries with
it an increased risk of a political rebuke. '291
This conception of equilibrium can be empirically tested. ULP
strikes provide an ideal measurement. First, the classification of a
strike as either economic or ULP is purely legal. This classification
never occurs unless there is litigation before an administrative law
judge, the NLRB or appellate courts and these arbiters label a strike
as one or the other.
Second, this classification is inherently subjective,292 since the
286. In short succession, Eskridge and Frickey use mixed metaphors to reach a positive
evaluation of the quality of law that is produced by this interaction. The first legal
metaphor states: "Just as a cable with three interwoven threads is stronger than a single-
threaded string, so a decision supported by three different institutional purposes is
stronger than a decision supported by a single one." Id at 350. The second metaphor
states: "Three heads might be better than one, especially if, as legal process theory posits,
each head brings a special expertise and satisfies different requirements the citizenry
expects from its government." Id
287. Id. at 28.
288. IM at 29.
289. Id at 71-72.
290. Id at 72.
291. Id
292. See Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1080 (1st Cir. 1981),
noting:
Applying objective criteria, the Board and reviewing court may properly
consider the probable impact of the type of unfair labor practice in question on
reasonable strikers in the relevant context. Applying subjective criteria, the
Board and court may give substantial weight to the strikers' own characterization
of their motive for continuing to strike after the unfair labor practice.
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legal test is whether an employer's unfair labor practice caused or
contributed to a strike293 The Board may also rule that an economic
strike converts to a ULP strike,294 or that a ULP strike converts to an
economic strike.2 95 The research value in this subjectivity is that it
reflects an adjudicator's substantive values, a core part of Eskridge
and Frickey's theory.
Third, this classification of strikes has real consequences for
unions and employers. A ruling that a strike is economic reinforces
the raw balance of economic power at the time of the strike. A ULP
strike ruling has the effect, however, of re-balancing economic power.
This decision inevitably benefits strikers who, in Justice O'Connor's
terms, lose their gamble.296
Fourth, because NLRB rulings reflects the Board Members'
substantive values, and these rulings occur in a political setting, this
agency serves as the kind of sensitive barometer that Eskridge and
Frickey describe. This sensitivity is underscored by the fact that few
agencies incur more congressional wrath than the NLRB. While
never threatening it with extinction, Congress has tried to cut the
Board's budget by 30%,297 threatened to filibuster appointment of its
293. See C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 (1989) (The Board's "General Counsel
must establish that the unlawful conduct was a factor (not necessarily the sole or
predominant one) that caused a prolongation of the work stoppage").
294. See Facet Enters., Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 152,153 (1988).
295. See Studio 44, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 597, 600-02 (1987); see also Trident Seafoods
Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 566, 569-70 (1979) (holding that employer's self-initiated cure of
ULPs converts ULP strike to economic strike). More recently, the Board stated in
Chicago Beef Co., 298 N.L.R.B. 1039, 1040 (1990), that "[i]n order to reconvert an unfair
labor practice strike, an employer must "unequivocally repudiate and rescind [its]
unlawful actions."
296. The Court has repeatedly stated that the NLRB is not to expand or contract
economic weapons available to employers and unions. See Insurance Agents Int'l, 361 U.S.
at 497 (holding that the Board generally may not act "as an arbiter of the sort of economic
weapons the parties can use"). But this view is naive. The more accurate and
sophisticated view appears in Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S.
404,416-17 (1982):
The Board also rests on this Court's admonition that the Board should balance
"conflicting legitimate interests" rather than economic weapons and bargaining
strength .... We think the Board has confined itself within the zone of discretion
entrusted to it by Congress. The balance it has struck is not inconsistent with the
terms or purposes of the Act, and its decision should therefore be enforced.
Where, as in Bonanno, the Court rules that an employer is not free to sever its tie
with a multiemployer bargaining group, or finds that a ULP caused a strike, or
expands permissible lockouts, the Board acts as an arbiter of economic weapons,
albeit indirectly.
297. See Susan J. McGelnick, NLRB Seeks $10 Million Budget Increase for Fiscal 1999
to Break Level-Funding Rut, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 22, at AA-6 (Feb. 3,1998).
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members,298 and filed amicus briefs to "signal" the Board in key
cases.299 Thus, the Board meets Eskridge and Frickey's functional
definition of a coordinate part of government that informs justices
about the risks in particular interpretations of statutory law.
B. Research Hypothesis and Methodology
It is reasonable to expect that the narrowing of the ULP strike
doctrine during the 1980s should result in a lower percentage of ULP
strikes observed in the 1990s. However, Law as Equilibrium suggests
a counter-intuitive hypothesis when it specifically defines
"equilibrium" as "a state of balance among competing forces or
institutions." This means that the percentage of ULP strikes ruled by
the NLRB should be constant.
This counter-intuitive idea might not seem so strange to Board
Members. Indeed, when John Raudabaugh, a Republican appointed
by President George Bush, assessed the prospect of being replaced on
the Board by President Bill Clinton's more liberal appointees, he
observed that the agency's enforcement statistics are remarkably
consistent, without regard to what party holds power." In other
words, he said that the Board's rulings are stable over time.
To test my hypothesis, I analyzed 530 NLRB cases involving
employer hiring of permanent striker replacements from 1938 to
1999. I created this database by using a variety of appropriate
keyword searches in WESTLAW's electronic database (e.g.,
"MACKAY RADIO" & STRIKE!). I read complete cases to ensure
that they involved employer hiring of permanent striker
replacements, and then coded information about these strikes. Later,
I analyzed selected variables, for example, duration of replacement
298. See Senate and White House Continue Talks on Filling Vacancies at Labor Board,
DAILY LAB, REP. (BNA) No. 5, at D4 (Jan. 7, 1994) (reporting on a threatened
Republican filibuster of William Gould's appointment as Chairman of the NLRB unless
President Clinton also nominated an acceptable management attorney to fill another
Board vacancy).
299. See Congressional Group Urges Preservation of Participation Programs in Brief to
NLRB, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 22, at A-9 (Feb. 3, 1992) (reporting that
Representatives Newt Gingrich, Steve Gunderson, William Goodling, Don Ritter, Paul B.
Henry, Richard K. Armey, John Boehner, Mickey Edwards, Scott Klug, and Cass
Ballenger filed a brief on behalf of employer).
300. See Raudabaugh Defends Republican Role in Seeking Disclosure of All NLRB
Nominees, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 225, at D3 (Nov. 24, 1993). Even though the
atmosphere in Congress concerning the Board's performance was highly charged,
Raudabaugh discounted as "mischievous criticism" the prevailing criticism that the
"playing field at the agency is skewed and needs to be corrected." Id.
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strikes,'3 1 severance of bargaining relationship, 3 2 or employer
treatment of strikers.3°3 In this study, I examined two variables: type
of strike (economic or ULP), and year of ruling that resulted in this
classification.
C. Results and Conclusions
Table 2 (infra) summarizes my data analysis. Most of the strikes
in my sample (467 out of 530) were classified as either economic or
ULP. I sorted strikes by their NLRB decision year, rather than the
year a strike began, because the latter often lagged by several years.
304
This detail is important to testing my hypothesis. To illustrate,
the 1989 TWA decision narrowed ULP strike doctrine; but for a strike
in my sample that began in 1985 and was adjudicated after TWA, the
ruling year is what matters because it accounts for the then-current
state of the ULP strike doctrine.35
The most remarkable feature of these results is the narrow
fluctuation of ULP strike rulings from the 1940s through the 1990s.
The 1950s and 1960s had identical ULP strike rates (47%), as did the
1940s and 1980s (39%). The 1990s rate was nearly identical (37%).
301. See Michael H. LeRoy, The Changing Character of Strikes Involving Permanent
Striker Replacements, 16 J. LAB. RES. 423 (1995).
302. See Michael H. LeRoy, Severance of Bargaining Relationships During Permanent
Replacement Strikes and Union Decertifcations: An Empirical Analysis and Proposal to
Amend Section 9(c)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.C DAVIS L. REV. 1019 (1996).
303. See Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Treatment of Permanently Replaced Strikers,
1935-1991: Public Policy Implications, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1995).
304. See e.g., Dorsey Trailers, Inc, 327 N.L.R.B. 155 (1999). In Dorsey, an unfair labor
practice strike commenced on June 26, 1995 and Board issued its decision on March 12,
1999.
305. See e.g., Chicago Tribune Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 259 (1991). In Chicago Tribune, an
economic strike began July 18, 1985, and converted to a ULP strike on Nov 13, 1985, but
NLRB did not adjudicate the case until August 23,1991.
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Table 2
Economic and ULP Strikes by Year of Board or Court Ruling.
1930s-1990s
1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Total
Economic Strikes 5 30 27 23 60 75 57 277
ULP Strikes 5 19 24 20 41 48 33 190
" ULP Strike
from Inception (5) (11) (15) (12) (19) (25) (21) (108)
" Economic Strike
Converted to ULP
Strike (0) (8) (9) (8) (22) (23) (12) (82)
Total Economic and
ULP Strikes 10 49 51 43 101 123 90 467
Percentage ULP Strikes 50% 39%47% 47% 41% 39% 37% 41%
Source: NLRB Decisions
Conclusions
The stable rate of ULP strike rulings is phenomenal when viewed
against the backdrop of the changing tides in labor-management
relations. These relations changed from accommodative in the
1950s3°6 to more confrontational by the late 1960s. 307 Amazingly,
however, as the ULP strike doctrine expanded in these decades, the
306. Professor Robert Dubin provided this typical assessment:
As collective bargaining becomes an established feature of our society both sides
come to recognize that each conflict created disorder is inevitably succeeded by a
reestablished order and that permanently disruptive disorder may materially
impede the resolution of the conflict. Thus collective bargaining tends to
produce self-limiting boundaries that distinguish permissible from subversive
industrial disorder.
Robert Dubin, Constructive Aspects of Industrial Conflict, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 37,
at 45 (Arthur Kornhauser et al. eds., 1954).
307. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L.
REv. 255, 261 (1990). In his article, Gordon explains that today's conflictual labor
relations began in the 1960s:
Management lawyers might claim they simply are responding to the de facto
revision of the conventional ground rules of capital-labor conflict, which has been
going on since the late 1960s. Even in traditionally organized sectors, employers
no longer accept unions as a necessary evil, but treat them as obstructions to be
moved away from, subcontracted around, or simply broken through aggressive
resistance or decertification.
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rate of ULP strike rulings remained unchanged.
This decisional stability held throughout the 1970s, even as
employers accelerated their confrontation by hiring "union-
avoidance" consultants.3°8 This trend had practical implications for
ULP strikes. More employers strategically violated the NLRA3°9
because the benefits of noncompliance outweighed the costs.
310
Combined with employers' growing provocation of strikes for
strategic union avoidance purposes,.31  this pattern of misconduct
should have produced a higher proportion of ULP strikes in the 1980s
and 1990s-but these rates remained essentially at earlier levels.
The stable rate is also remarkable considering how much union
bargaining power changed since Mackay Radio was decided in 1938.
Even though Executive Orders negated scores of strikes, including
those with striker replacements, 312 by seizing struck plants and
308. Jules Bernstein, The Evolution of the Use of Management Consultants in Labor
Relations: A Labor Perspective, 36 LAB. L.J. 292, 296 (1985) (citing AFL-CIO estimates
that "75 percent of all employers hire consultants today at an annual cost of over
$100,000,000 to guide employer efforts in seeking to avoid unionization during union
organizing campaigns"); see generally Terry A. Bethel, Profiting from Unfair Labor
Practices: A Proposal to Regulate Management Representatives, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 506
(1984); MARTIN JAY LEVrITr, CONFESSIONS OF A UNION BUSTER (1993) (describing a
consultant's personal account of union-busting tactics).
309. See generally William N. Cooke, The Failure to Negotiate First Contracts:
Determinants and Policy Implications, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 163 (1985); Morris M.
Kleiner, Unionism and Employer Discrimination" Analysis of 8(a) (3) Violations, 23 INDUS.
REL. 234 (1984); John J. Lawler, The Influence of Management Consultants on the
Outcome of Union Certification Elections, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 38 (1984); see also
CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 47-51 (1993) (discussing virulent employer opposition to unions);
BENNETT HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPORATE
RESTRUCrURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA 48-50 (1988) (discussing union
avoidance strategies); Richard B. Freeman, Why Are Unions Faring Poorly in NLRB
Representation Elections? in CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING AMERICAN LABOR 45,
54-61 (Thomas Kochan ed., 1985).
310. See Robert J. Flanagan, Compliance and Enforcement Decisions under the National
Labor Relations Act, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 257,278 (1989).
311. See JOHN J. LAWLER, UNIONIZATION AND DEUNIONIZATION: STRATEGY,
TAC'TICS, AND OUTCOMES 182 (1990):
In what seems to be an increasingly common scenario, an employer either forces
or takes advantage of a strike to secure deunionization .... [I]n a protracted
strike in which the employer holds fast to its position, discord is apt to build
among the striking the employees, leading some to return to work; the employer
may also hire permanent replacements for the strikers. This then sets the stage
for a decertification effort... an RM petition, or withdrawal of recognition.
312. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 8928, 6 Fed. Reg. 5559 (1941). The facts of this
replacement-worker strike involving Air Associates are more fully reported in BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 714, REPORT ON THE WORK
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imposing settlements on unions and employers,313 the ULP strike rate
OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD MARCH 19, 1941-JANUARY 12, 1942
App. C at 53-54 (1942); Air Associates, Inc., 20 N.L.R.B. 356 (1940).
313. Manufacturing is an example. See Exec. Order No. 8773, 6 Fed. Reg. 2777 (1941)
(seizing North American Aviation), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 8814, 6 Fed. Reg.
3253 (1941); Exec. Order No. 8868, 6 Fed. Reg. 4349 (1941) (seizing Federal Shipbuilding
& Drydock Co.), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 9012, 7 Fed. Reg. 145-46 (1942); Exec.
Order No. 8928, 6 Fed. Reg. 5559 (1941) (seizing Air Associates, Inc.); Exec. Order No.
9225,7 Fed. Reg. 6627 (1942) (seizing S.A. Woods Machine Co.); Exec. Order No. 9229,7
Fed. Reg. 6630 (1942) (seizing General Cable Corp.); Exec. Order No. 9254, 7 Fed. Reg.
8333 (1942) (seizing Triumph Explosives, Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9351, 8 Fed. Reg. 8097
(1943) (seizing Howarth Pivoted Bearings Co.); Exec. Order No. 9375, 8 Fed. Reg. 12,253(1943) (seizing Atlantic Basin Iron Works), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 9377, 8 Fed.
Reg. 12,963 (1943); Exec. Order No. 9399, 8 Fed. Reg. 16, 269-70 (1943) (seizing
Remington-Rand Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9395B, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,957 (1943) (seizing leather
manufacturing plants in Massachusetts), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 9403, 8 Fed.
Reg. 16,957 (1943); Exec. Order No. 9400, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,641 (1943) (seizing Los Angeles
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp.); Exec. Order No. 9416, 9 Fed. Reg. 936 (1944) (seizing
York Safe & Lock Co.), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 9527, 10 Fed. Reg. 424-25 (1945);
Exec. Order No. 9435, 9 Fed. Reg. 4063 (1944) (seizing Jenkins Bros. Inc.); Exec. Order
9436, 9 Fed. Reg. 4063-4065 (1944) (seizing Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Co. and Ken-Rad
Transmitting Tube Corp.); Exec. Order No. 9438, 9 Fed. Reg. 4459 (1944) (seizing
Montgomery Ward & Co.); Exec. Order No. 9443, 9 Fed. Reg. 5395 (1944) (seizing
Hummer Mfg.); Exec. Order No. 9466, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,139 (1944) (seizing several machine
shops); Exec. Order No. 9473, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,613-615 (1944) (seizing International Nickel
Co.); Exec. Order No. 9475A, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (1944) (seizing Hughes Tool Co.); Exec.
Order No. 9477, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,941 (1944) (seizing Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co.); Exec.
Order No. 9480, 9 Fed. Reg. 11,143 (1944) (seizing Twentieth Century BrassWorks, Inc.);
Exec. Order No. 9484, 9 Fed. Reg. 11,731 (1944) (seizing Farrell Cheek Steel Co.); Exec.
Order No. 9508, 9 Fed. Reg. 15,079 (1944) (seizing Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc.); Exec.
Order No. 9511, 10 Fed. Reg. 549 (1945) (seizing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.);
Exec. Order No. 9523, 10 Fed. Reg. 2133 (1945) (seizing American Enka Corp.).
Many coal production and processing plants were also seized. See Exec. Order No.
9320, 8 Fed. Reg. 3687 (1943) (seizing Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroads.); Exec. Order
No.9393, 8 Fed. Reg. 14,877 (1943) (seizing several coal mines); Exec. Order No. 9469, 9
Fed. Reg. 10,343 (1944) (seizing Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co.); Exec.
Order No. 9474, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,815 (1944) (seizing Ford Colleuses Co. and Pittsburgh Coal
Co.); Exec. Order No. 9476, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,817 (1944) (seizing several coal companies);
Exec. Order No. 9478, 9 Fed. Reg. 11,045 (1944); Exec. Order No. 9481, 9 Fed. Reg. 11,387
(1944) (seizing several coal mines); Exec. Order No. 9482, 9 Fed. Reg. 11,459 (1944);
Exec. Order No. 9483, 9 Fed. Reg. 11,601 (1944); Exec. Order No. 9484, 9 Fed. Reg.
11,731 (1944) (seizing Farrel Cheek Steel Co.); Exec. Order No. 9536, 10 Fed. Reg. 3939
(1945).
The motor and rail transportation industries did not go unaffected. See Exec. Order No.
9462, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,071 (1944) (seizing several motor carriers); Exec. Order No. 9108, 7
Fed. Reg. 2201 (1943) (seizing the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Co.); Exec. Order
No. 9341, 8 Fed. Reg. 6323 (1943) (seizing the American Railroad Co. of Puerto Rico);
Exec. Order No. 9412, 8 Fed. Reg. 17,395 (1943) (authorizing seizure of all railroads
threatened by a December 30, 1943 strike); Exec. Order No. 9516, 10 Fed. Reg. 1313
(1945) (seizing the Bingham & Garfield Railroad Co.).
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for the 1940s was about the same as for any other decade. Following
the war, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics began to compile
statistics on large strikes, annual strike activity was high and steadily
grew until it peaked in the 1970s; thereafter, it plummeted.314 This
dramatic trend is particularly relevant because more employers seem
to be relying on the Mackay Radio doctrine to curb this activity.
315
Yet through all these changes, the ULP strike rate remained stable.
In short, this phenomenon cannot be explained by conventional
labor law or industrial relations theories. Law as Equilibrium
provides robust explanations, however. Congress' vague treatment of
the right to strike in the original Wagner Act316 left the door open to
the judiciary for rule-type precedents. When early courts were
sharply divided on replacement strikes,317 the Mackay Radio Court
responded in Solomonic fashion by finding a middle ground
doctrine.318 This doctrine's political ingenuity is reflected by the fact
that Congress did not begin to challenge it until 1989.319 When the
Court perceived that Congress was undercutting collective bargaining
by permitting employers to exploit strikes to sever bargaunng
relationships with unions,320 the Mastro Plastics Court settled this
matter. Even though this decision lacked the compromise quality of
Mackay Radio, it never provoked a congressional response. In short,
Finally, the textiles and food processing industries were also affected. See Exec. Order
No. 9420, 9 Fed. Reg. 1563-64 (1944) (seizing Arkwright Corp., Berkshire Fine Spinning,
Associates, Inc. Border City Mfg. Co., Bourne Mills, Howard Arthur Mills, Richard
Borden Mfg., and Sagamore Mfg. Co.); Exec. Order No. 9505, 9 Fed. Reg. 14,4783 (1944)
(seizing Cudahy Bros.).
314. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Work Stoppage Data:
Number of Work Stoppages Idling 1,000 Workers, visited on May 29, 1999,
<http://146.142.4.24/cai-binlsurveymost>: strike activity per year: 1947 (270); 1948 (245);
1949 (262); 1950 (424); 1951 (415); 1952 (470); 1953 (437); 1954 (265); 1955 (363); 1956
(287); 1957 (279); 1958 (332); 1959 (245); 1960 (222); 1961 (195); 1962 (211); 1963 (181);
1964 (246); 1965 (268); 1966 (321); 1967 (381); 1968 (392); 1969 (412); 1970 (381); 1971
(298); 1972 (250); 1973 (317); 1974 (424); 1975 (235); 1976 (231); 1977 (298); 1978 (219);
1979 (235); 1980 (187); 1981 (145); 1982 (96); 1983 (81); 1984 (62); 1985 (54); 1986 (69);
1987 (46); 1988 (40); 1989 (51); 1990 (44); 1991 (40); 1992 (35); 1993 (35); 1994 (45); 1995
(35); 1996 (37); 1997 (29); 1998 (34).
315. See, e.g., testimony of Thomas Donohue, supra note 32.
316. See 29 U.S.C. § 163. Ironically, by using "construed" in defining how this right is
enforced, Congress appeared to admonish the federal courts-an institution with a history
for intervening in strikes in favor of employers-to preserve this statutory right. See id.
317. See supra note 107.
318. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & TeL Co., 304 U.S. 333,345-46 (1938).
319. See infra note 290.
320. See 1 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT HISTORY, supra, note 153; 2
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT HISTORY, supra, note 154.
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it adjusted striker replacement policy without provoking conflict with
Congress. Hence, the striker-replacement and ULP doctrines had
enough pliability to allow the NLRB, federal courts, and Congress to
bring their substantive values to bear on particular labor disputes.
These doctrines were also so elastic in their application that Congress
accepted them until recently.32'
The ability of Law as Equilibrium to explain the stable rate of
ULP strikes in the 1980s and 1990s is especially impressive. As
unions faced the prospect of collapse in this period,322 institutional
consensus for the striker-replacement and ULP strike doctrines broke
down. The Workplace Fairness Act, a bill to repeal Mackay Radio
and TWA, 323 was narrowly defeated in the 102nd324 and 103rd 25
321. See Strike Replacement Bill Introduced by Rep. Clay, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
No. 24, at A-7 (Feb. 5, 1990) (reporting introduction of the first bill to ban hiring of
permanent striker replacements); Rep. Clay Chides Employers for Refusing Invitation to
Testify on Strike Bill, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 185, at A-9 (Sept. 24, 1990) (reporting
that the bill died in subcommittee).
322. See Craver, supra note 309, at 35.
323. See H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992). This bill had two provisions. See id. The
first part proposed to make it unlawful for an employer "to offer, or to grant, the status of
permanent replacement employee to an individual for performing bargaining unit work
for the employer during a labor dispute." Id This would have repealed Mackay Radio's
striker replacement dictum. The second part of the bill proposed to make it unlawful for
an employer:
to otherwise offer, or grant, an individual any employment preference based on
the fact that such individual was employed, or indicated a willingness to be
employed, during a labor dispute over an individual who-
(A) was an employee of the employer at the commencement of the dispute;(B) has exercised the right to join, to assist, or to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection through the labor organization involved in the dispute; and
(C) is working for, or has unconditionally offered to return to work for, the
employer.
Id. In effect, this provision proposed to repeal TWA. The text of the bill appears in
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?clO2:1:./temp/clO2IT4gyp: (Congress's Internet
site, visited on May 16, 1999).
324. The House passed the bill on a recorded vote, 247-182, on July 17, 1991, but was
sidetracked by a threatened filibuster. See Striker Replacement Bill Faces Uncertain Future
in Senate, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 143, at A-17 (July 25, 1991). Thus, the bill was
not brought before the full Senate until nearly a year later. President Bush dampened
prospects for passing the bill when he threatened to veto it. See Administration Policy
Statement on S 55 Workplace Fairness Act, June 9, 1992, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No.
112, at F-1 (June 10, 1992). Bush said the bill "would destroy a prime component of the
economic balance between labor and management in collective bargaining." Id As the
bill was being readied for Senate debate, Sen. Robert Packwood offered a compromise
version that would have limited an employer's right to hire permanent replacements if a
union refused to submit its dispute to an advisory fact-finding panel and went out on
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But even as Congress failed to alter these doctrines, leaving the
judiciary's constricted interpretations in place, the NLRB strongly
signaled its unwillingness to accept the emerging status quo. In
deference to labor's role in the 1992 elections, 326 President Clinton
appointed William Gould IV, the first NLRB Chairman to have direct
experience as a union lawyer.327
Departing at times from a Board Member's reserved form of
expressing a point of view, Chairman Gould signaled his rejection of
Pattern Makers in unusually blunt language.328 He was just as frank in
questioning the Court's interpretation of an employer's duty to
bargain. 329  In several key cases, he joined a majority that
strike. See Senate Fails To Invoke Cloture on Striker Replacement Bill, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 114, at A-10 (June 12, 1992); Text of Substitute Version ofS 55, Including the
Packwood Amendment, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 115, at D-1, D-2 (June 15, 1992).
On June 16, 1992, the bill and its proposed amendments failed on a 57-42 vote to limit
debate. See Senate Kills Bill to Restrict Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 117, at A-17 (June 17,1992).
325. The bill failed on a Senate vote to cutoff a threatened filibuster. See Senate Vote to
End Filibuster on Striker Replacement Fails 53-47, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 132, at
AA-1 (July 13, 1994); Defeat of Striker Replacement Bill a Victory for Business Coalition,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 133, at D4 (July 14,1994).
326. See Getting Their Due, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 10,1993, at A12.
327. See Questions for Professor Gould, THE DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 5,1993, at 2B.
328. See Monson Trucking, 324 N.L.R.B. 933, 939 (1997). In a concurrence, Chairman
Gould said:
In my view, Pattern Makers is inconsistent with the Act's objectives and, under
certain circumstances, I believe unions may impose sanctions in the interest of
solidarity. What was at stake in Pattern Makers was the proper balance between
the competing principles of employees' right to engage in concerted activity
favored by Federal labor policy... and the right to refrain from such activity. In
Pattern Makers, first the Board and then, by relying on the Board's expertise, the
Court gave focus solely to the right to refrain from concerted activity. The result
has been an erosion of the core Section 7 right to engage in concerted activities
which, coupled with the employer's right to permanently replace economic
strikers upheld in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., has in many
circumstances made exercise of the right to strike protected by Section 13
difficult if not well nigh impossible. Accordingly, I am of the view that the Board
can and should change its mind on this matter and reject the Pattern Makers
rationale.
Id.
329. See Q-1 Motor Express, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 767,771 (1997). Chairman Gould, in a
concurrence, said:
[B]y giving labor costs a dominant role in the interpretation of First National
Maintenance... the Board absolves the employer of the obligation to bargain
once that employer asserts that labor costs are not a consideration in its decision.
The result is a clear invitation to posturing, game playing, and obfuscation in an
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distinguished an employer's attempted use of TWA's strategy to
induce strikers to cross over, thus depriving these employers of the
beneficial use of that precedent.330 In one case, albeit in a footnote, a
Board majority that included Gould openly disregarded TWA. 331
In addition, Gould was part of a majority that established an
important new Board presumption that an employer hires only
temporary striker replacements, unless the employer expressly states
that such hiring is permanent.332 This new presumption forced
employers to choose between exposing themselves to Belknap-type
lawsuits or foregoing the Mackay Radio doctrine.333  Thus, a
attempt to conceal and deceive. The possibility of deception is further aided by
the limited amount of information that unions have access to as part of the
bargaining process. Ultimately, under the Board's current standard, the answer
to the question of whether the employer's decision implicates labor costs will be
learned only after time consuming, lengthy litigation. Equally important, in the
bargaining which precedes litigation, there will be an incentive not to share
information which might establish the wrong motivation in ensuing NLRB
proceedings.
Id.
330. See Caterpillar, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1130, 1130 (1996) ("[W]e emphasize that this is
not the same type of situation as in TWA v. Flight Attendants. In TWA, the Supreme
Court held that an employer is not required to lay off junior crossover employees in order
to reinstate more senior full-term strikers at the conclusion of a strike. Our unfair labor
practice finding here does not conflict with that decision.").
331. See Medite of New Mexico, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1145, 1148 n.12 (1994). In an
ending footnote, the Board quietly signaled its unwillingness to follow TWA:
Because the positions put up for bid are vacant positions, a striker's successful
bid for the position does not result in displacing any of the strike replacements or
earlier returned strikers. Therefore, our ruling here is not inconsistent with the
principles underlying NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. Cf. TWA v.
Flight Attendants, (holding that an employer is not obligated to permit strikers to
use their seniority to displace less senior strike "crossovers") (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
Id. The italicized text signifies the factual connection to TWA.
332. See O.E. Butterfield, Inc. 319 N.L.R.B. 1004 (1995). "[B]ecause an employer is
the party with superior access to the relevant information, the burden should logically be
placed on it to show that it had a mutual understanding with the replacements that they
are permanent .... It is therefore incumbent on the employer, which has control over
employees' status, to communicate clearly with employees as to whether they have been
hired on a permanent or temporary basis." Ild. at 1006.
333. See Foreman v. AS Mid-America, 586 N.W.2d 290 (Neb. 1998). The Nebraska
Supreme Court ruled that the employer made an enforceable promise to striker
replacements that they would be free from harassment and intimidation by reinstated
strikers. See id at 301. The court concluded that "appellants relied on these
representations and were damaged as a result." Id. at 305. Relying on Belknap, the court
ruled that the striker replacements' "claims state a cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation and the claim is not preempted by federal labor law." Id
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precedent that unions perceive as harmful was turned on its head.
334
As a practical matter, this ruling mooted the doctrinal significance of
Mackay Radio and Mastro Plastics by treating employer hiring of
striker replacements as only temporary. In these cases, the Board
ignored AU rulings that an economic strike converted to a ULP
strike, and ruled that since the replacements were only temporary, the
employer must immediately reinstate strikers.335
Looking back on sixty years of the economic and ULP strike
doctrines, the theoretical principles of Law as Equilibrium are clearly
in evidence. The main progenitors of these doctrines, the NLRB and
Supreme Court, took "actions that serve their preferences or goals,
and that, in pursuing such goals, institutional actors act in light of the
knowledge that they are interdependent. '336 In the most recent
interaction between the Gould Board and the Supreme Court, these
institutions "behave[ed] strategically, anticipating the responses of
[each] other.., and signaling the nature and intensity of their
preferences to ... [each] other. '337
Taking a much longer view, Law as Equilibrium explains the
oddly congruent positions of the two main architects of national labor
policy, Sen. Robert Wagner and Sen. Robert Taft. The former, in
proposing and leading the way toward enactment of the pro-union
NLRA in 1935, sought "equality of bargaining power" between
workers and their employers through collective bargaining. 338 His
Republican counterpart used virtually the same language to promote
334. See Selected Statements on Striker Replacement Legislation (HR 5) Delivered
Before House Education and Labor Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 45 at D-1, D5 (March 7,1991) (reporting testimony of Lane
Kirkland, President of AFL-CIO). "H.R. 5 would overturn the judicially created
'permanent strike replacement' doctrine first stated in Labor Board v. Mackay Co., 304
U.S. 333 (1938) and more recently amplified in such decisions as Belknap v. Hale"
(citations omitted).
335. See e.g., Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373 (1997) (concluding that "the
replacements did not understand that they were hired as permanent employees and that
the Respondent did not intend for them to be so." This effectively negated the ALT's
ruling that the company's conduct prolonged the strike and converted an economic strike
into an unfair labor practice strike.) Id. See also U.S. Serv. Indus., 315 N.L.R.B. 285, 286-
87 (1994) (concluding that economic strikers were entitled to reinstatement because
employer had not made offer of permanent employment to striker replacements).
336. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 33.
337. Id.
338. Sen. Wagner believed that the "[t]he primary requirement for cooperation is that
employers and employees should possess equality of bargaining power." 78 Cong. Rec.
367 (Mar. 5, 1934), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 20 (1985).
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sweeping pro-employer reforms of the NLRA in 1947.339
By the convention of two Court-approved doctrines, one
permitting replacements to permanently replace strikers, and another
to permit ULP strikers to be immediately reinstated at the expense of
replacements, the contrasting interests of these legislative architects
have been balanced. In the process, the law's tempering influences
have abated the harshest aspects of labor disputes. Thus, the NLRA,
although an aging statute, has evolved to bring into equilibrium not
only the law of striker replacements, but also, the opposing interests
of unions and employers and the conflicting policy preferences of the
coordinate branches 40
339. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3950 (Apr. 23, 1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 1007
(1974):
It seems to me that our aim should be to get back to the point where, when an
employer meets with his employees, they have substantially equal bargaining
power, so that neither side feels that it can make an unreasonable demand and
get away with it .... If there is reasonable equality at the bargaining table, I
believe that there is much more hope for labor peace.
340. But see Brudney, A Famous Victory, supra note 9, at 1035 (opining that appellate
courts are altering settled interpretations of the NLRA; thus, this law is an aging statute
"being applied in legal and social circumstances unknown to its original authors and
proponents").
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